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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers expect the tools of discovery in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will extract relevant information from almost every source they
can find. At the same time they hope their own files will be protected from
discovery by at least one of two familiar rules. Many documents can be
protected by asserting the attorney-client privilege, since Rule 26(b)(1)
authorizes discovery only of “any matter, not privileged.”1
Other
documents in counsel’s file will be litigation work product that can be
withheld from routine discovery under Rule 26(b)(3) until there has been “a
showing of substantial need . . . and that the party is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the material by other
means.”2 As a result, in most cases an objection to discovery of a
document in counsel’s files will not be challenged and judges will rarely be
asked to decide whether some documents must be produced.
Discovery disputes over documents in counsel’s file are not so rare in
cases in which counsel represented the client during the transaction that led
to the lawsuit. Earlier representation makes it likely there will be a variety
of confidential documents counsel created or edited with the expectation of
a successful transaction, not litigation. Some of these earlier documents
may fit within the attorney-client privilege protection for a client’s
confidential disclosures to counsel. Other documents can best be described
as transaction work product. This latter category may include letters from
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counsel to the client reporting facts counsel learned from the other party or
facts learned from third parties through due diligence research about a
planned deal, memoranda and drafts counsel sent to the client suggesting
changes in documents for the proposed deal, or counsel’s memos or
working papers that do not reveal what the client told counsel. Transaction
work product will not always be relevant, but in some cases it may be at the
heart of the dispute. For example, if the issue is when a party first had
knowledge of a fact or received notice of an event, the critical information
may have been revealed in a le tter from the party’s own counsel. This
material may resemble Rule 26(b)(3) work product but differ because it
was prepared before litigation was anticipated.
There is a substantial body of federal caselaw that examines whether
transaction work product can be protected from discovery. The caselaw
will not be found under the topic “transaction work product” because no
opinion uses that label, a simple fact that itself provides an important clue.
As lawyers sort documents to determine which to produce and which to
withhold, they apparently think only of the two familiar rules. In fact, by
limiting their analysis to the two familiar rules they are left with no choice.
It seems unlikely that a transaction document will be found to have been
created in anticipation of litigation as required by Rule 26(b)(3) to meet the
definition of litigation work product. That leaves the attorney-client
privilege as the obvious ground, so lawyers regularly rely on that privilege
and assert that the transaction documents they wrote or edited are protected
from discovery by the attorney-client privilege. Thus, the issue in the
federal caselaw on discovery of transaction work product has been whether
such material is privileged. The federal courts have almost always held
that the federal law of the attorney-client privilege does not protect
documents that do not reveal the client’s confidential communications.
The persistence with which lawyers continue to assert the attorneyclient privilege in the face of almost certain rejection of that ground by
federal courts might appear at first to be just stubbornness, ineptitude, or
dilatory avoidance of discovery obligations. The working hypothesis
explored in this Article is that none of those is the correct explanation, and
that instead it is important to recognize this is an issue where both lawyers
and judges have been misled from the start by the assumption that the two
familiar rules are the only rules. The familiar rules that regulate discovery
of privileged documents and litigation work product do not provide correct
answers for transaction work product. Lawyers would be better able to
recognize which transaction work product documents can be protected
from discovery, and would be more successful in arguing that they are
protected, if they recognized that transaction work product is a separate
category of material not covered by the two familiar rules. In the same
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manner, judges could create more coherent and accurate doctrine if they
developed a separate rule to regulate the discovery of transaction work
product.
As a theoretical question, this third option of a separate body of
doctrine for the category of transaction work product has always been
possible. It is uncodified doctrine, so it does not require a new statute or an
amendment to the Federal Rules. It is solidly grounded on the United
States Supreme Court’s 1947 decision in Hickman v. Taylor3 that first
recognized a work product doctrine. It remained viable after the partial
codification of the doctrine in 1970 provided a textual basis for protecting
litigation work product under Rule 26(b)(3). As a practical question,
however, the third option is not viable. The possibility has been ignored
for so long that the assumption that privilege and litigation work product
are the only two options is solidly entrenched. Even suggesting a third
option appears almost heretical. For that reason, it is important to sketch
how the various doctrines are interrelated and to describe how this topic
might be examined from a different perspective.
The foundation for privilege law on this issue can begin with
Hickman, an opinion which started from the premise that the attorney-client
privilege did not protect either the statements counsel obtained from nonclient witnesses or the memoranda and writings prepared by counsel that
did not reveal the client’s disclosures.4 In Upjohn Co. v. United States5 the
Court held that the attorney-client privilege protected factual disclosures
from employees of a corporate client to counsel, but assumed that counsel’s
notes and memoranda would not be privileged if they contained material
other than factual disclosures from the client. A solid body of federal court
decisions has filled out the framework of Hickman and Upjohn by holding
that the attorney-client privilege protects both the confidential documents
in which a client disclosed facts to counsel and confidential documents
written by counsel that reveal the client’s factual disclosures.6 Under this
traditional definition of the scope of the privilege, a typical transaction file
will contain many documents that are privileged and not discoverable
because they reveal the client’s disclosures to counsel. If, however, the
3

329 U.S. 495 (1947).
See id. at 508.
5
449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981).
6
See, e.g., In re Six Grand Jury Witnesses, 979 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir. 1992); In re
Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Under Seal, 748 F.2d
871, 874 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1977); United States
v. United Techs. Corp., 979 F. Supp. 108, 110-11 (D. Conn. 1997); Guzzino v. Felterman,
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1995).
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transaction document does not directly or indirectly reveal the client’s
disclosures to counsel, a discovery objection on the basis of the attorneyclient privilege will not succeed. 7
A smaller set of federal court decisions appears to provide greater
protection for material in the transaction file. These opinions have stated or
held that the attorney-client privilege covers all advice to the client or any
confidential communication to the client in the course of providing legal
services.8 While many of these lower federal court decisions on closer
reading turn out to be dictum or applications of state law in a diversity
case,9 there are enough to create an impression of a split among federal
courts between the traditional scope of the privilege that protects
confidential documents only if they reveal the client’s disclosures, and a
“broader” scope that protects most or all communications from counsel to
client.10
Some commentators label the traditional scope a “narrow” view and
describe the federal courts as split between the narrower and broader
scopes11 or among variations on them. 12 The commentators tend to prefer
the broader scope, but most devote little space to the issue. One offers the
unhelpful advice that the ruling on the issue will depend on whether “a
particular court views the privilege as a benefit or burden.”13 The
Restatement of The Law Governing Lawyers declares the broader scope is
preferable but does not examine whether that is the federal rule; it also
7
See, e.g., Am. Standard v. Pfizer, 828 F.2d 734, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Christman v.
Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 251, 255-56 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Midwestern Univ.
v. HBO & Co., No. 96 C 2826, 1999 WL 32928, at *2−*4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 1999); Athridge
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 200, 204, 209 (D.D.C. 1998); Overseas Private Inv.
Corp. v. Mandelbaum, No. CIV.A.97-1138CKK/JMF, 1998 WL 647208, at *2 (D.D.C.
Aug. 19, 1998); Federal Election Comm. v. Christian Coalition, 178 F.R.D. 61, 66 (E.D. Va.
1998); Evans v. Atwood, 177 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1997); Salgado v. Club Quarters, Inc.,
No. 96 CIV.383(LMM)(HBP), 1997 WL 227598, at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 1997);
Ziemack v. Centel Corp., No. 92 C 3551, 1995 WL 314526, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 1995);
United States Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 162 (E.D.N.Y.
1994); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 133 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
8
See, e.g., Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1268 n.12 (9th Cir. 1979); Muller v. Walt Disney
Prods., 871 F. Supp. 678, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Arcuri v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 154
F.R.D. 97, 102 (D.N.J. 1994); United States v. Mobil Corp., 149 F.R.D. 533, 536 (N.D. Tex.
1993); Fine v. Facet Aerospace Prods. Co., 133 F.R.D. 439, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); PitneyBowes v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
9
See infra notes 100-36 and accompanying text.
10
See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 602-03 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
11
See, e.g., EDNA EPSTEIN, T HE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK -PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 40-46 (1997).
12
See generally 24 CHARLES WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5491 (1994).
13
Id. § 5491, at 454.
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suggests that the differences between the two definitions of scope will not
matter most of the time.14 These descriptions and preferences offer little
help to a lawyer who must decide if the attorney-client privilege will
actually protect a specific document, or to a federal judge who must decide
whether to sustain a claim that a document is privileged. For both lawyers
and judges the practical questions are: which caselaw most accurately
states the federal rule, how to determine whether a document meets the
correct test, and whether there are any other limits on discovery of material
that is not privileged.
Both the extent of division in the federal courts over the scope of the
attorney-client privilege and the actual support in the cases for the broader
scope of the privilege have been much overstated by the commentators.
The traditional scope may be labeled as the narrow view by some but it is
still the more accurate definition of the scope of the privilege under federal
law. What has been labeled as the broader view should instead be called a
distortion of the traditional scope of the privilege. Only the traditional
view provides the correct analysis when the attorney-client privilege is the
ground for objecting to discovery of transaction documents that do not
directly or indirectly reveal the client’s confidential disclosures to counsel.
That, however, does not explain why lawyers keep invoking the privilege
ground, nor does it explain why some judges and so many commentators
encourage lawyers to continue to do so by questioning the viability of the
traditional scope of the privilege.
The support of judges and commentators for expanding the traditional
scope of the privilege seems to be a product of the assumption that there
are only two possible limits on discovery and the assumption that the only
protection for non-privileged material is the codified language in Rule
26(b)(3) for litigation work product. These assumptions rest on a narrow
and inaccurate reading of Hickman. The work product doctrine became
part of discovery law in Hickman after the Supreme Court held that
confidential material created by counsel was not privileged if it did not
reveal the client’s disclosures. In the second part of Hickman, the Court
held that some non-privileged but confidential material created by counsel
should be protected from routine discovery, that some material might be
discoverable on adequate grounds, and that discovery of the mental
impressions or memoranda of counsel should be allowed only in “a rare
situation.”15 The doctrine was “substantially incorporated” 16 into Federal
Rule 26(b)(3) in the 1970 amendments.
14
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 cmt i. and Reporter’s Note
cmt. i Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996.
15
329 U.S. at 512-13.
16
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981).
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The birth of the doctrine in a case in which the facts involved
litigation work product, and the doctrine’s partial codification in a rule for
litigation work product, may make it appear to protect only litigation work
product. That appearance may have fostered a belief that privilege law was
the only way to protect transaction work product, or at least an assumption
that the uncodified law of attorney-client privilege was more open to
revision than the interpretation of Rule 26(b)(3). Those arguing for
expanding the privilege have not mentioned that this effort to fill a
perceived gap in the work product rule by changing the law of privilege
would completely invert what the Court did in Hickman. They also have
not examined the anomaly of providing complete protection under a
privilege for documents that do not meet the standards for qualified
protection as work product.
While the facts of Hickman, the Hickman doctrine, and Rule 26(b)(3)
seem to blend together in the law of work product, the caselaw doctrine and
language of the rule differ. For example, in Hickman the material in
dispute was created by counsel, but under Rule 26(b)(3) the work product
may also be created by a party or a party’s representatives. The expansion
of the work product category in the Rule was limited by requiring the
documents be prepared in anticipation of litigation and by a comment that
it does not cover documents prepared “in the ordinary course of
business.”17 That does not mean the same limit was part of the Hickman
doctrine for documents created by counsel. Anticipation of litigation might
provide a useful dividing line if the facts involve accident reports in a tort
case such as Hickman, but that does not mean that it will necessarily be the
best dividing line if the facts of the litigation involve a transaction in which
counsel created documents.
There are a few opinions that do not regulate discovery of transaction
work product under the privilege; instead they suggest expanding the other
familiar rule that protects counsel’s files. These opinions do no more than
suggest an expansive interpretation of Rule 26(b)(3) by reading the
“antic ipation of litigation” language to include documents prepared in
advance of any lawsuit, which analyzed the likely outcome of litigation that
might arise from a transaction, or were “prepared . . . because of the
prospect of litigation.”18 While this interpretation could in time expand the
codified part of the doctrine to include some transaction documents, this is
an uncertain possibility at best because it goes far beyond the conventional
reading of the language used in the Federal Rules.
A third option of separate uncodified doctrine for transaction work
17

Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Advisory Committee’s Note].
18
United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998).
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product would allow the courts to develop more specific regulations for
discovery of confidential documents in counsel’s transaction file. Under
this third option, confidential transaction documents written by counsel that
do not reveal a client’s disclosures to counsel would remain outside the
scope of the attorney-client privilege, but they still could be protected from
routine discovery. This option recognizes that there may be good reasons
why an attorney’s transaction file should not be routinely discoverable.
Furthermore, it provides a framework for examining that issue in a manner
that does not distort the law of attorney-client privilege and does not
overextend the language of the discovery rules.
This Article will examine the proper scope of the attorney-client
privilege, and consider how discovery of counsel’s transaction work
product could be regulated under an uncodified branch of work product
doctrine. Part I of this Article will examine the foundation of the
traditional scope of the attorney-client privilege established in Hickman and
Upjohn. Part II will examine the two lines of federal cases on the scope of
the attorney-client privilege. Part III will examine the commentary and the
policy arguments that have been advanced for expanding the traditional
scope of the privilege. Part IV will describe the parameters of the
uncodified-work-product policy that can be derived from Hickman and
Upjohn. The conclusion in Part V will consider how this third option
might affect the law of privilege and discovery practice.
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I. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT P RIVILEGE IN THE SUPREME COURT
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938 there was little
reason to consider whether confidential transaction documents authored by
counsel should be protected from discovery. While lawyers created
documents and wrote letters to clients before then, the Reporter for the
Restatement notes that “[t]he question was largely irrelevant in an earlier
legal culture that did not provide for pretrial discovery and in which calling
a lawyer to the witness stand was very rare.”19 The classic treatment of the
issue in Wigmore’s Evidence was entirely contained in a brief paragraph
within discussion of the attorney-client privilege:
§ 2320. Communications by the attorney to the client. That the
attorney’s communications to the client are also within the privilege
was always assumed in the earlier cases and has seldom been brought
into question. The reason for it is not any design of securing the
attorney’s freedom of expression, but the necessity of preventing the
use of his statements as admissions of the client . . . or as leading to
inferences of the tenor of the client’s communications—although in this
latter aspect, being hearsay statements, they could seldom be available
20
at all . . . .

The fact that Wigmore emphasized protecting the client’s
communications strongly suggests that the rule he described incorporates a
further unstated assumption that the lawyer’s advice was based only on the
client’s description of the facts or the client’s statement of goals for a
transaction. Since that unstated assumption would mean the lawyer did not
learn any facts from others, the only relevant information that could be
gleaned from counsel’s confidential documents would very likely provide
clues about the client’s disclosures to counsel. The rationale of protecting
the client’s confidential disclosures, however, does not support the same
scope for the privilege if counsel has acquired information in the course of
investigating and gathering facts from sources other than the client. For
half a century the Supreme Court has consistently drawn a distinction
between protecting information disclosed by the client and protecting
information the lawyer obtained from some other source.
A. The Foundation of Hickman
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938,
they permitted discovery of all relevant non-privileged information from
opposing litigants and third parties; the Rules did not expressly exclude

19
20

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 14, at 359.
8 JAMES WIGMORE , EVIDENCE § 2320 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. 1961).
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discovery of material contained within the files of opposing counsel. A
substantial disagreement arose very quickly among the lower federal courts
about whether they should allow discovery of the material in opposing
counsel’s files that had been prepared for litigation. 21 As a result, in 1946
the Advisory Committee proposed an amendment to Rule 30 that would
limit discovery of such material:
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing
obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety,
indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for
trial unless satisfied that denial of production or inspection will unfairly
prejudice the party seeking the production or inspection in preparing
his claim or defense or will cause him undue hardship or injustice. The
court shall not order the production or inspection of any part of the
writing that reflects an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories, or except as provided in Rule 35, the
22
conclusions of an expert.

The Advisory Committee’s Note accompanying the proposed
amendment summarized the holdings of the substantial body of caselaw;
they ranged from a rule that such material was generally subject to
discovery to a rule it was not subject to discovery at all. 23 The Note gave
specific attention to the pending case of Hickman v. Taylor in which the
Supreme Court had just granted certiorari. 24 It described the Third
Circuit’s en banc holding that material prepared for trial was not
discoverable, because it was within the scope of privileged documents, and
noted that all but one member of the Advisory Committee questioned that
view.25 The Note suggested that the privilege exception to discovery was
limited to the traditional evidence privileges. While the Supreme Court did
not approve the amendment to Rule 30 proposed by the Advisory
Committee,26 it did use Hickman v. Taylor both to adopt a limitation along
the lines recommended by the Advisory Committee and to reject the
resolution that had been adopted by the Third Circuit.
Hickman v. Taylor involved a suit for damages by the estate of
Norman Hickman, a crewmember of the tug John M. Taylor that sank in

21

See generally 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. M ILLER & RICHARD L. M ARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2021 (1994).
22
Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts
of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 456-57 (1946) [hereinafter 1946 Advisory Committee’s
Note].
23
See id. at 458-60.
24
See Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. granted, 328 U.S. 876
(1946).
25
See 1946 Advisory Committee’s Note, 5 F.R.D. at 460.
26
See Order Amending Rules of Civil Procedure, 329 U.S. 843 (1946).
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the Delaware River from unknown causes. The tug owners hired counsel
almost immediately to represent them in the anticipated litigation. During
the next two months counsel for the owners obtained statements from the
surviving crew members, interviewed other witnesses, and wrote
memoranda of what they told him. The discovery dispute arose a year later
after Hickman sued and demanded production of those written statements
of witnesses, counsel’s memoranda, and a summary of any oral statements
of witnesses. The defendant objected on the ground the material was
“privileged matter obtained in preparation for litigation.”27 The trial court
held the material was not privileged and ordered production of the material,
allowing defense counsel the option to first submit counsel’s own
memoranda to the court for review.28 The Third Circuit reversed and held
the material was the “work product of the lawyer” and, therefore,
privileged from discovery. 29
The Supreme Court rejected the privilege argument in a single
paragraph:
We also agree that the memoranda, statements and mental impressions
in issue in this case fall outside the scope of the attorney-client
privilege and hence are not protected from discovery on that basis. It is
unnecessary here to delineate the content and scope of that privilege as
recognized in the federal courts. For present purposes, it suffices to
note that the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to
information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for
his client in anticipation of litigation. Nor does this privilege concern
the memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared by
counsel for his own use in prosecuting his client’s case; and it is
equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney’s mental
30
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.

The remainder of the majority opinion and the concurring opinion are
the well-known foundation for the protection of the lawyer’s file as work
product. The scope of the work product policy will be explored in this
Article in Part IV. The present issue is whether anything more can be
learned from the Court’s declaration that the material was not covered by
the attorney-client privilege.
While the Court noted it would not provide a full discussion of the
attorney-client privilege, it is still possible to draw some additional insight
from what the Court did and did not say, and from the surrounding
circumstances. Some elements of the privilege were not mentioned as
27
28
29
30

Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
See id. at 482-83.
Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945).
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
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reasons for finding the material was not privileged, such as whether the
documents were confidential or whether the attorney was providing legal
services when he obtained the statements from the witnesses or
summarized the information supplied by the witnesses. The Court did set
out the plaintiff’s argument that the witnesses were “third persons rather
than . . . his clients,” 31 and seemed to endorse that distinction when it noted
that the privilege did not cover information “from a witness.”32 Similarly,
when the Court stated that counsel’s own notes and other writings were not
privileged, it did not provide any additional explanation. The Court’s
factual descriptions focused on counsel’s notes and writings about what he
had learned from witnesses and not what he had been told by the tug
owners, his clients.33 The Court’s approach to these topics further confirms
it was applying a rule that a client’s disclosures to counsel could be within
the privilege, but that information counsel learned elsewhere was not
privileged.
The proposed amendment to Rule 30 that was before the Court at the
same time as Hickman was accompanied by an Advisory Committee
description of the attorney-client privilege that was consistent with
Wigmore’s broad formulation of its scope:
Of course, it has been held that communications to an attorney by his
client or advice given to a client by his attorney are privileged within
the well settled meaning of that term in evidence and hence not the
34
proper subject of inquiry.

Since the Court rejected the amendment to Rule 30 in favor of the
caselaw approach in Hickman it did not have to expressly affirm, modify,
or disavow this description of the privilege as including advice to the client
in general. It is clear that the Court did not follow this description of the
privilege when it considered the facts of Hickman. The Court never
mentioned whether counsel’s notes and memoranda had been prepared for
the client, seen by the client, or sent to the client as part of counsel’s advice
regarding the progress of the litigation. If any of those facts were thought
sufficient to include counsel’s material within the privilege, the Court could
have decided the case on that ground. However, the Court did not do so,
since it concluded that the information from a witness is not privileged
without discussing whether a lawyer’s later inclusion of the non-privileged
information in advice to the client would convert it into privileged
information.
Each of the three kinds of non-privileged material in the litigation file
31
32
33
34

Id. at 506.
See id. at 508.
See id. at 498, 508.
1946 Advisory Committee’s Note, 5 F.R.D. at 458.
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in Hickman might resemble material in a transaction file. For example, the
“information which an attorney secures from a witness”35 might resemble
the facts about the transaction that counsel learns from third parties. The
“memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared by
counsel” 36 might be similar to preliminary drafts of transaction documents
and editorial changes to documents by counsel. The attorney’s “mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories”37 might be
comparable to counsel’s internal memoranda that describe how and when
the documents must be drafted or edited for the transaction in order to
protect the client against various problems that might arise in the future.
There are two reasons to remember that Hickman provides a
foundation for defining the scope of the attorney-client privilege. The first
is that comparing a transaction document against the documents in
Hickman provides a gauge of the kind of material that falls outside the
privilege even though it was prepared by counsel in the course of providing
legal services to a client and maintained with the same confidentiality as
the client’s factual disclosures to counsel. The second is that Hickman did
not hold that all documents created by counsel are routinely discoverable
just because they do not reveal the client’s confidential disclosures. The
Court recognized that there were strong policy arguments against discovery
of counsel’s work product, but distinguished between absolute protection
under the privilege and protection against routine disclosure under the work
product doctrine. This point calls for emphasis and repetition, because the
arguments in the caselaw and commentary for expanding the scope of the
privilege often seem to rest on a tacit assumption that there is only a stark
choice between the privilege and no protection.
B. The Court’s Version of the Evidence Rules
The Supreme Court’s definition in Hickman of the scope of the
attorney-client privilege remained in effect through the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court’s adoption of the 1973 Rules had no
permanent effect, because Congress suspended them before they took
effect.38 Nevertheless, some commentators suggest that a trend toward a
broader scope of the privilege includes the Court’s approval of a version of
the attorney-client privilege that would “adopt the broader view and make
the lawyer’s communications to the client privileged as well as the client’s

35

Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
Id.
37
Id.
38
See 1 JACK WEINSTEIN & M ARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE , at
xix-xxi (J. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1999).
36
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communications to the lawyer.”39 While the Court in other areas has not
felt bound to continue with positions it adopted in the 1973 Rules,40 those
Rules could be considered somewhat persuasive authority if the
commentators are correct. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the 1973
Rules to see if they can be described as part of this broadening trend.
The 1973 Rules defined the privilege with language that could be read
to cover all communications in both directions:
Rule 503. Lawyer-Client Privilege
...
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the client, (1) between himself or his
41
representative and his lawyer or his lawyer’s representative . . . .

If that language extended the privilege to all documents authored by
counsel and sent to the client, including documents that do not reveal the
client’s confidential disclosures, it would negate the premise in Hickman.
On its face the language is ambiguous, as one of the Court’s major opinions
on the attorney-client privilege illustrates. In Upjohn Co. v. United States42
the Court used the broader phrase “communications between an employee
and counsel” as a substitute in the very same paragraph for the narrower
phrase, “communications by Upjohn employees to counsel,” that described
its actual holding. 43 Ambiguous language is not persuasive authority that
the Court understood and intended that the 1973 language would reject
Hickman, especially since neither that effect nor Hickman itself were
mentioned anywhere in the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 503.
Nonetheless, neither that effect nor Hickman itself were mentioned
anywhere in the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 503.
In any event, the Court’s 1973 Rules never became effective because
they were suspended by Congress for further study. 44 In the subsequent
Congressional enactment of the Rules, the governing language for each
specific privilege was replaced with a short statement that privileges “shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
39

1994).

2 CHRISTOPHER M UELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK , FEDERAL EVIDENCE 324 (2d ed.

40
Compare FED . R. EVID. 505(a), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 245 (Proposed Official
Draft 1972), with Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
41
FED . R. EVID. 503, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-36 (Proposed Official Draft
1972).
42
449 U.S. 383 (1981).
43
449 U.S. at 397.
44
See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1974).
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interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience.”45 That language left Hickman as the Court’s authoritative
statement of the scope of the privilege under the common law.
In the Supreme Court’s next discussion of the attorney-client
privilege, decided shortly after the adoption of the final version of Rule
501, the Court still described the privilege as protecting only disclosures by
clients to their attorneys. The issue in Fisher v. United States46 was
whether the attorney-client privilege protected tax records the client had
transferred to the attorney in the course of seeking legal advice.47 The
Court held that transferring the records to the attorney did not give them
any more or less protection from a government summons than if the client
had retained them. 48 The opinion described the privilege in a manner fully
consistent with Hickman:
Confidential disclosures by a client to an attorney made in order to
obtain legal assistance are privileged . . . . The purpose of the privilege
is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys . . . .
As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information
could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure
than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be
reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain
fully informed legal advice. However, since the privilege has the effect
of withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies only
where necessary to achieve its purpose. Accordingly it protects only
those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice which
49
might not have been made absent the privilege.

The consistent emphasis on protecting the client’s disclosures and
applying the privilege only where it will protect the client’s disclosures
does not support an argument that the Court intended to broaden the
protection of the attorney-client privilege to include all communications
from the attorney to the client. The same emphasis also reaffirms that the
entirety of an attorney’s file is not necessarily protected by the attorneyclient privilege. If the purpose of providing legal services is not a
sufficient ground for including documents a lawyer obtained from the
lawyer’s own client within the privilege, that purpose alone will likewise
not be a sufficient ground for including documents obtained from third
parties within the privilege.

45
46
47
48
49

FED . R. EVID. 501.
425 U.S. 391 (1976).
See id. at 403.
See id. at 396, 402.
Id. at 403.
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C. Adding to the Foundation in Upjohn
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Hickman still provided a
foundation for the scope of the attorney-client privilege when it addressed
the privilege in the corporate context in Upjohn Co. v. United States.50 The
most prominent issue in Upjohn was whether the attorney-client privilege
should include factual information disclosed to the corporate attorney by all
employees of the corporate client or just factual information disclosed to
the corporate attorney by members of the “control group” for the
corporation. The Court’s holding, that the privilege included factual
disclosures to the attorney by all employees of the client,51 resolved the
question of discovery for most of the disputed material. The Court,
however, also had to consider whether there was any other protection for
material that was not covered by the privilege.
One category of other material consisted of factual disclosures to the
corporate attorney by former employees of the corporate client about their
activities when they had been employed. 52 The Court declined to decide
whether that material was privileged, because the issue had not been
addressed by the lower courts. While the Court’s brief footnote 53 did not
explore the issue, the best explanation assumes the continued validity of the
premise of Hickman. If a former employee is considered a representative
of the corporate client when they discuss what they did while employed,
the factual disclosure is privileged. The factual disclosure is not privileged
if the former employees are considered to be third party witnesses, which is
how the employees of the noncorporate defendant in Hickman were
viewed.
The second category of other material in Upjohn was notes and
memoranda that corporate counsel described as containing “what I
considered to be the important questions, the substance of the responses to
them, my beliefs as to the importance of these, my beliefs as to how they
related to the inquiry, my thoughts as to how they related to other
questions.”54 The Court concluded that the attorney-client privilege
covered material that corporate counsel described as “any notes reflecting
responses to interview questions”55 by employees of the corporate client,
but the Court explained that it was still necessary to consider the work
product doctrine because the privilege would not cover “notes and
memoranda of interviews [that] go beyond recording responses to his
50
51
52
53
54
55

449 U.S. 383 (1981).
See id. at 394-95.
See id. at 394 n.3.
See id. at 397 n.6.
Id. at 400 n.8.
Id. at 397.
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questions.”56 Again, the distinguishing feature between the material that
was privileged and the material that was not privileged was the source of
the content of the material. Even though the Court expressed no doubt that
the attorney made the notes in order to provide legal services, and
expressed no doubt that the notes were confidential, this was not enough to
make them privileged. The critical element was the source of the
information for the notes, since the notes that needed some protection other
than the privilege were the notes that did not record the responses of the
corporate employees.
There is some language in Upjohn that can be used in support of a
broader scope for the attorney-client privilege,57 but the context indicates
that the Court did not intend to modify the foundation set out in Hickman.
While the Court noted that the privilege exists to protect both “the giving of
professional advice” and “the giving of information to the lawyer,” 58 the
Court did not hold that all fact gathering by a lawyer is covered by the
privilege. That statement was made in discussing whether the privilege
covered disclosures by all corporate employees or disclosures by just the
control group. The Court’s holding was limited to fact gathering from
employees of a client.
Similarly, while the Court at one point summarized its holding on the
scope of the privilege by broadly describing “communications between an
employee and counsel,” 59 that phrase was used only as the equivalent in the
same paragraph for the narrower description of “communications by
Upjohn employees to counsel.”60 The facts of the case never raised an
issue about when a communication from counsel to an employee would be
privileged. The actual holding stated only that communications by Upjohn
employees to counsel would be privileged, a holding fully consistent with
Hickman’s premise that communications in the other direction from
counsel will not always be privileged.
D. The Privilege after Swidler & Berlin
The Court’s most recent opinion on the attorney-client privilege was
the well-publicized case, Swidler & Berlin v. United States.61 While the
facts of this case did not raise the specific issue of interest here, the Court’s
approach reaffirms that the lessons learned from the earlier cases are still
56

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981).
See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 601-03 (1981); 1 SCOTT STONE &
ROBERT T AYLOR, T ESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 1-80 n.307 (2d ed. 1995).
58
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
59
Id. at 397.
60
Id.
61
524 U.S. 399 (1998).
57

2000]

TRANSACTION WORK PRODUCT

245

correct. The case arose out of the Special Prosecutor’s investigation of
certain White House actions.62 In the course of the investigation a federal
grand jury focused on the actions of former Deputy White House Counsel
Vincent Foster, who had died nine days after meeting with an attorney to
obtain legal representation. 63 During the two hours they met, Foster’s
attorney made three pages of handwritten notes.64 When the grand jury
issued a subpoena for the notes, the law firm moved to quash it on the
grounds of the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.65
After examining the notes, the district judge quashed the subpoena.66 The
court of appeals held that the attorney-client privilege did not always
survive the death of the client and that the privilege could be set aside
under a balancing test.67
The Supreme Court ruled that the notes could be withheld from the
grand jury because the attorney-client privilege survived the death of the
client.68 This holding was based on the unquestioned proposition that the
notes, although written by the attorney, would have been privileged if the
client still had been alive, because the attorney made them during the client
interview and discovery of the notes would have revealed the content of the
client’s confidential disclosures.69 The Court’s holding is consistent with
Hickman and Upjohn, even though there was no need to revisit the issues
raised in those cases. In addition, the Court’s proposition that the
“common law rule embodied in the prevailing caselaw”70 should not be
overturned without a sufficient showing of the wisdom of the change
affirms that Hickman and Upjohn still provide the foundation.
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT P RIVILEGE IN FEDERAL CASELAW
The lower federal courts have generally applied the attorney-client
privilege to material within the scope defined by the Supreme Court, but
the caselaw must be read with care. Opinions may not distinguish between
different ways of phrasing a rule when the facts or the arguments of the
parties do not suggest the difference will really matter, so it is of little help
to count how many opinions may describe the privilege as protecting a
lawyer’s advice or a client’s disclosures. Just summarizing the cases may
62

See id. at 401.
See id. at 401-02.
64
See id.
65
See id. at 402.
66
See id.
67
See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 402; see also In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
68
See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 410-11.
69
See id. at 408.
70
Id. at 411.
63
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give a false impression that there is more disagreement than actually exists
or suggest that an interpretation is supported by more authority than can be
actually marshaled. It is important, therefore, to survey the cases in
sufficient depth to identify the mainstream body of authority and at least
account for the major variations.
A. The Traditional Scope of the Privilege
For half a century one of the most influential federal court opinions on
this topic has been the district court opinion of Judge Wyzanski in United
States v. United Shoe Machine Corporation.71 In this civil antitrust action
the government proposed to introduce a number of letters that were legal
opinions United Shoe had received from independent lawyers.72 While
United Shoe had surrendered the letters in response to a subpoena, the
parties had stipulated that this would not waive the privilege. Although
United Shoe argued that all letters from counsel to their client were
privileged, Judge Wyzanski drew a distinction. 73 He agreed that all the
letters were from lawyers giving legal advice, but that did not mean that all
the letters were privileged. 74 The important distinction was the relationship
between the client’s privileged disclosures to counsel and the content of
each letter, with the privilege protecting letters based on the client’s
disclosures:
[I]n so far as these letters to or from independent lawyers were
prepared to solicit or give an opinion on law or legal services, such
parts of them are privileged as contain, or have opinions based on,
information furnished by an officer or employee of the defendant in
75
confidence . . . .

In contrast, Judge Wyzanski held that a letter would not be privileged
if the advice was based on facts the attorney learned from someone other
than the client and cited the then recent decision of the Supreme Court in
Hickman:76
Thus, for example, there is no privilege for so much of a lawyer’s
letter, report, or opinion as relates to a fact gleaned from a witness, . . .
or a person with whom defendant has business relations, . . . or a public
77
document such as a patent . . . or a judicial opinion.

Judge Wyzanski’s opinion was rather brief, but in succeeding decades
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
See id. at 359.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
United Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).
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his general outline of the attorney-client privilege became a “much quoted
formulation” 78 and his exclusion from the privilege of documents that did
not reveal the client’s disclosures was followed in many opinions. For
example, the Second Circuit relied on United Shoe in concluding that the
privilege “protects only those papers prepared by the client for the purpose
of confidential communication to the attorney or by the attorney to record
confidential communications,” 79 and that “a communication from an
attorney is not privileged unless it has the effect of revealing a confidential
communication from the client to the attorney.”80 District judges, likewise,
relied on United Shoe to conclude that the privile ge “extends to the
attorney’s legal advice and opinions which encompass the thoughts and
confidences of the client,” 81 but that it “does not cover an attorney’s
communications . . . which are based upon conversations with third
parties”82 and “does not extend to opinions of counsel which are unrelated
to any [confidential] communication by the client.83
As other courts applied and rephrased the United Shoe distinctions or
applied them to other questions, there came opinions that described the
privilege more broadly as covering all confidential communications from a
lawyer to a client. Whether the scope of the privilege was this extensive
was discussed at length in two mid-1970s district court opinions. In United
States v. IBM,84 Chief Judge Edelstein began with an analysis of United
Shoe and concluded:
[T]he focus of the privilege must be on protecting confidential
information revealed to the lawyer by the client . . . . And in resolving
the question of the extent to which the lawyer’s communications to the
client are privileged, the courts have focused on the need to protect the
confidentiality of what the client revealed to the lawyer.
....
. . . IBM has cited a series of cases which assertedly stand for the
proposition that all communications made by the attorney to the client
are privileged. However, a careful reading of these cases suggests that
any more expansive protection is based on the desire to protect
85
confidential communications made by the client to the lawyer.

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962).
Id. at 639.
United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106, 122 (2d Cir. 1970).
Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 37 (D. Md. 1974).
Foley v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Congoleum Indus. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
66 F.R.D. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Id. at 211-12.
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In SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,86 then-District Judge Newman framed
one issue as whether “the privilege protects all advice from attorney to
client, or only advice that reveals (by adoption or implication) a fact
communicated in confidence by the client to the attorney.”87 Judge
Newman concluded that the privilege category did not include all advice
from counsel, because the caselaw from United Shoe to IBM that had
applied the traditional scope of the privilege had not been superseded by
the smaller number of cases that suggested the privilege could cover all
legal advice.88 Judge Newman did acknowledge the argument that the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence would have protected all
communications from the attorney, but did not find the argument
persuasive because the Advisory Committee’s Note neither mentioned the
issue nor explained why the proposed rule adopted the broader position. 89
Judge Newman concluded there was “no reason to broaden the privilege
beyond the narrow standard as set forth in United Shoe.”90
Judge Newman also considered the related issue of whether the
privilege protected the memoranda in counsel’s files that had not been sent
to the client. He applied both Hickman and United Shoe to hold that the
memoranda would be privileged “if they reveal information supplied in
confidence by the client” but that memoranda that did not do so would not
be protected by the privilege.91
In the following years the D.C. Circuit generated much of the caselaw
because the scope of the attorney-client privilege was often an issue in
cases in whic h an agency asserted the privilege as a ground for resisting
demands for documents under the Freedom of Information Act.92 In the
first case in this series, Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States
Department of the Air Force,93 the issue was whether the Air Force had to
disclose documents that dealt with negotiations between the Air Force and
West Publishing over the use of the copyrighted West key number
system. 94 Some of the documents were legal opinions from Air Force
attorneys that provided advice about both the law and possible courses of
action. The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that privileged
material could be withheld from disclosure but disagreed with the lower
court’s conclusion that the privilege covered all confidential
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn. 1976).
Id. at 520.
See id. at 520-22.
See id. at 522.
Id.
Id. at 523.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
See id. at 247-48.
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communications between attorney and client.95 The court stressed the
importance of identifying the source of the information in the lawyer’s
opinion letter by noting that:
[i]n the federal courts the attorney-client privilege does extend to a
confidential communication from an attorney to a client, but only if that
communication is based on confidential information provided by the
96
client.

In subsequent Freedom of Information Act cases, the D.C. Circuit
adhered to the holding in Mead Data that the privilege applies to letters
from the attorney to the client only if the attorney’s letter is based on
confidential information provided by the client.97 The D.C. Circuit
continued to build on that foundation when it applied the same rule on the
scope of the attorney-client privilege to criminal investigations in which
witnesses resisted grand jury demands for documents:
Communications from attorney to client are shielded if they rest on
confidential information obtained from the client. Correlatively, “when
an attorney conveys to his client facts acquired from other persons or
98
sources, those facts are not privileged.”

Discovery disputes about the scope of the attorney-client privilege
still continue to produce a solid body of current caselaw from federal
appellate courts and federal trial courts in which the opinions start with the
proposition that communications from an attorney to a client are protected
by the attorney-client privilege only to the extent that they reveal a client’s
confidential communications.99 As the authority cited in support of this
proposition is traced back, sometimes in several steps through the caselaw
described above, it is clear that the foundation is still Hickman and the
Supreme Court’s definition of the scope of the attorney-client privilege.
The next questions are why there is a body of federal caselaw that seems to
suggest the privilege is broader and whether the privilege should be broader
than the traditional scope.

95

See id. at 248.
Id. at 254.
97
See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862-64 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Brinton v. Dep’t of State, 636 F.2d 600, 603-04 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
98
In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
99
See, e.g., United States v. Under Seal, 748 F.2d 871, 874 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Brand
Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 663684, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 1995); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 133 F.R.D. 515, 518
(N.D. Ill. 1990).
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B. Indicia of a Broader Privilege in Federal Court
The federal court opinions that seem to suggest a broader scope for
the attorney-client privilege can be sorted into at least three major
categories, with each category defined by the reason for rejecting the
opinion as persuasive authority on the scope of the privilege under federal
law. One category, which might be labeled “dicta,” contains cases in
which a court made a generalized statement that the privilege includes legal
advice but did not focus on the specific question of interest here.100 A
second category, which might be labeled “unsupported,” contains cases in
which the conclusion depends on a combination of misinterpretation of
Supreme Court opinions and failure to recognize the applicability of those
opinions.101 A third category, which might be labeled “diversity,” contains
cases that are applying the privilege law of a state in a diversity case as
required by Federal Rule 501 and, therefore, do not provide guidance on
the scope of the federal privilege.102
An important example of the first category is United States v.
Amerada Hess Corp.,103 a Third Circuit opinion from 1980 that seems to
suggest that the privilege should cover all advice from counsel to client,
even if the advice does not reveal any confidential disclosures made by the
client. The issue arose when Amerada resisted an Internal Revenue Service
summons that was part of an investigation of possible bribes to foreign
officials and the way those bribes were treated on tax returns.104 Amerada
had ordered an internal investigation by a committee of four outside
directors, with outside counsel interviewing fifty officers and employees in
order to obtain information for the committee.105 Amerada had turned over
the committee report, but refused to turn over the report by counsel to the
committee or the list of persons the lawyers had interviewed. 106 The IRS
did not seek the lawyer’s report, but it did seek the list of fifty
interviewees.107 Amerada’s contention that the list was protected by the
100

See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1048 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Defazio, 899 F.2d 626,
635 (7th Cir. 1990); Wells v. Rushing, 755 F.2d 376, 379 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 985-87 (3d Cir. 1980).
101
See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 601-03 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
102
See, e.g., Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1368-69 (10th Cir. 1997); In
re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 965 (3d Cir. 1997); Nat’l Educ. Training Group, Inc. v.
Skillsoft Corp., No. M8-85 (WHP), 1999 WL 378337, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1999);
Robertson v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 143 F.R.D. 194, 197 (S.D. Ill. 1992).
103
619 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1980).
104
See id. at 982.
105
See id.
106
See id. at 982-83.
107
See id. at 983.
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attorney-client privilege was rejected by the district court on two
grounds.108 First, the court determined the privilege did not apply to
communications from an attorney to a client.109 Second, the court decided,
even if the privilege did apply, the list was not privileged. 110
The Third Circuit rejected the trial court’s first ground, because it was
clearly wrong to exclude all legal advice or all communications by counsel
to client from the protection of the privilege.111 The circuit court still
affirmed the trial court because the list of witnesses was not legal advice at
all nor did it disclose the contents of a confidential communication from
the client to its attorneys.112 The opinion must be read carefully because, at
the time, the Third Circuit was applying its “control group” test for
determining which disclosures by corporate employees were covered by the
privilege. In its holding on the scope of the privilege the Third Circuit
cited Hickman and drew the distinction that is still critical between
documents that might reveal the attorney’s investigation and documents
that might reveal a client’s confidential disclosures to the attorney. 113
While this pre-Upjohn opinion said that the list did not reveal what anyone
“in the control group” for Amerada told counsel about any potential
witness, the list itself is described as a list of names which did not reveal
what anyone at Amerada had told counsel. The court’s holding that an
attorney’s investigative work is not within the privilege is a direct
application of Hickman.
The Amerada opinion, on the other hand, also seems to support the
position that the privilege protects all confidential communications in both
directions between client and counsel:
Two reasons have been advanced in support of the two-way application
of the privilege. The first is the necessity of preventing the use of an
attorney’s advice to support inferences as to the content of confidential
communications by the client to the attorney [8 Wigmore on Evidence
§ 2320 (McNaughton Rev. 1961)]. The second is that, independent of
the content of any client communication, legal advice given to the
114
client should remain confidential [United States v. Bartone].

This quotation is not a particularly strong precedent in support of
applying the privilege to communications in both directions. Besides being
dictum that does not support the actual holding, it is expressly only a

108
109
110
111
112
113
114

See id. at 984.
See United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 985 (3d Cir. 1980).
See supra note 20 and accompanying text .
See id. at 986.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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description of two reasons that have been “advanced” and not a declaration
that the second reason is sufficient to support the asserted proposition. The
quotation from Wigmore was examined earlier.115 The citation to Bartone
adds almost nothing because the issue was never raised in that case and it is
discussed there only in the most oblique way. 116 While the listing of the
two reasons provides a useful quotation or citation for the proposition that
the federal courts apply the broader scope of the privilege, the opinion itself
points to no additional supporting authority. For example, one state court
opinion suggested that the Third Circuit’s opinion shows that “[n]ot all
decisions of the Federal Courts have followed” Hickman but did not
examine whether that was the actual holding of Amerada.117
An example of both the first and second categories, because it
combines dictum and unsupported assertion, is the district court opinion in
the case of In re LTV Securities Litigation.118 In this case the discovery
dispute concerned documents generated by outside counsel in the course of
investigating accounting problems at LTV; LTV resisted disclosing the
documents to stockholders who had brought a securities fraud class
action.119
The court describes the documents as reports and
communications from counsel to senior management at LTV that disclosed
information outside counsel had learned from interviewing LTV
employees.120 As the court itself noted, Upjohn had held that all factual
disclosures from LTV employees to counsel, not just factual disclosures by
the control group, were covered by the privilege.121 Since those disclosures
were apparently what the plaintiffs were demanding in discovery, and
would be covered by the traditional scope of the privilege, there was no
need to consider whether the privilege would have a broader scope in a
different setting.
Nevertheless, the court discussed whether there is a difference in the
application of the privilege for communications from the attorney to the
client.122 After noting several of the decisions that had developed the
traditional rule, the court declared that the rule fails to protect client
disclosures adequately and that it does not recognize the fact-gathering role
of the attorney. 123 The court then asserted that the federal courts do not
follow the traditional rule:
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

See id.
See United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1968).
Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 523 A.2d 968, 970 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
See id. at 598.
See id. at 600-01.
See id. at 602.
See id. at 602-03.
See id.
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A broader rule prevails in the federal courts, a rule that protects from
forced disclosure any communication from an attorney to his client
124
when made in the course of giving legal advice.

The authorities cited in support of this conclusion do not include
Hickman nor the caselaw that applied Hickman. Instead, the policy
grounds rested on then the recent decision in Upjohn and its emphasis on
the importance of factual investigation to providing legal advice:
[A]n attorney can be asked directly about the substance of unprivileged
communications received from third parties and cannot resist disclosure
on grounds that such information was later conveyed to the client
unless, of course, this information was obtained by the attorney as part
of an investigation necessary to give legal advice. To the extent prior
decisions have denied privilege to such data they must give way to
Upjohn. The linchpin of privilege then is not necessarily whether the
facts were relayed from attorney to client because they can be
privileged under Upjohn even if they were not. Instead, the focal point
125
is the purpose of the lawyer in gathering the data.

The fault in this analysis is the assertion that Upjohn replaced
Hickman’s test of the source of the information in counsel’s
communication with a test based on the purpose for which counsel obtained
that information. Upjohn assumed only that the purpose was an essential
element, since the privilege does not cover exclusively nonlegal or business
advice; Upjohn did not treat that purpose as a sufficient element.126 In
retrospect it is clear that on the specific facts of In re LTV Securities the
Court’s discussion is dictum because the source for all the information is
described as being various employees of LTV. Since the reports by
counsel to LTV were setting out privileged information learned in
confidential disclosures from LTV’s employees, it would have been
protected by the traditional scope of the privilege. Similarly, Upjohn
emphasized that factual disclosures to counsel could be covered by the
privilege because fact-gathering was an important part of a lawyer’s
function, but it did not hold that all fact-gathering by counsel was protected
by the privilege. If it had, there would have been no reason in Part III of
Upjohn to discuss the lesser protection of work product for such nonprivileged information.
An example of all three categories, because it includes dictum,
unsupported assertion, and state evidence law, is provided by a recent
opinion from the Tenth Circuit in Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc.127 In
124
125
126
127

In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 602-03 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
Id. at 603.
See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
129 F.3d 1355 (10th Cir. 1997).

254

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:229

this employment discrimination case the former employee sought a
memorandum that had been prepared by a staff attorney for the employer
and sent to senior management. The attorney had mentioned the
memorandum to another employee, but the trial court did not order the
employer to disclose it. On appeal the court held that it was protected from
discovery by the attorney-client privilege.128 Once again this result might
well be supported by a straightforward application of Upjohn. From the
facts mentioned in the opinion it appears that the staff attorney based his
advice on what he was told by corporate employees and what he learned
from corporate personnel data.129 Since the staff attorney was responsible
for the human resources department, reading the advice would necessarily
disclose what the lawyer learned in confidential disclosures protected by
Upjohn.
Again the court did not stop with Upjohn, but instead offered its own
view on whether the privilege protects communications from counsel that
do not reveal the client’s confidential communications. With citations to
Amerada and In re LTV Securities, the court concluded that the Tenth
Circuit had adopted the broader rule two decades earlier, even though the
earlier case had actually done no more than reject the argument that the
privilege did not cover any communication from an attorney. 130 Instead of
examining the issue in any greater depth this time, the court turned for
further support to Kansas law, which the court interpreted as following the
broader rule.131 Since the case involved both claims under federal law and
Kansas law the case presented the complicated issue of how to apply
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 when the same evidence may be privileged
under one body of law but not privileged under the other.132 Rather than
address that issue, the court concluded that the law was the same and relied
heavily on Kansas law.133
There is a substantia l body of similar federal caselaw on the scope of
the attorney-client privilege that is actually based on state law.134
Sometimes the court is explicit that it is following state law, but that fact is
not always apparent. As a result, it is easy to overlook the issue and
assume that an opinion in a diversity case is persuasive on the scope of the
128

See id. at 1369-71.
See id. at 1369-70.
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privilege in federal court, when Federal Rule of Evidence 501 instead
commands the federal court to apply state law.135 This is an issue on which
the states may follow a different rule, and several important states clearly
do that.136 The variation among the states can provide relevant evidence in
any search for the best rule, but it is still important to differentiate between
diversity cases and those cases that establish the federal law of the
privilege.
There is no need to catalog every federal court opinion on this issue.
It is sufficient to note the need to read the federal caselaw with care when
addressing the specific question of the scope of the privilege under federal
law. An attorney seeking to protect transaction documents under the
attorney-client privilege must temper the strongly held hope that there is a
solid body of caselaw in support of the broader scope of the privilege with
the disappointing reality that the authority of the precedent for the broader
scope will evaporate upon careful analysis.
III. THE P OLICY ARGUMENTS ON THE SCOPE OF THE P RIVILEGE
The variety in the caselaw raises important questions for both
attorneys and federal judges. If the traditional scope still defines the
federal privilege, lawyers should not assert the privilege as a basis for
withholding documents that do not reveal a client’s confidential
disclosures. When lawyers do withhold documents from discovery and
invoke the privilege as the basis for doing so, they should assert that the
document reveals a client’s confidential disclosures and be prepared to
support that assertion. Federal judges applying the privilege within its
traditional scope should continue to reject claims of privilege for
documents that are described only as “providing legal services” or “legal
advice to client,” because those labels are not an assertion that a document
will reveal a client’s confidential disclosures. On the other hand, if the
federal rule includes all communications from a lawyer to a client, then
those labels will be sufficient to support the privilege and federal judges
should sustain the claim of privilege. By themselves the lower court
opinions cited in support of the broader scope seem insufficient to
outweigh the caselaw from the Supreme Court and other federal courts that
supports the traditional scope of the privilege, particularly since the
opinions do not examine why the federal courts should abandon the
traditional scope. So why is there an issue?
On this topic the secondary literature tends to support a broader scope
for the privilege under federal law even though the federal court cases do
135
136
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not, and does so in a way that may provide lawyers or judges with less
guidance than they have come to expect. Many authors give this topic little
attention at all, and for lawyers in particular a brief discussion can easily be
misleading. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to preserve a client’s
confidences and secrets.137 Even though the ethical duty is broader, the
privilege can readily be invoked to protect all documents found in a
lawyer’s files from casual or unauthorized inquiries. A proper discovery
request can be resisted only on a ground such as privilege, and at that point
the lawyer resisting discovery may turn to the treatises for authority to
support an instinctive response to withhold the document. For that
audience a description of the caselaw can make the broader rule appear to
be more accepted than it is, and a description of lower court opinions alone
can make them seem more authoritative than they are. As a result the
lawyers who rely on the literature for a short summary of the law may be
unprepared to assert the privilege correctly and will find they must
eventually produce documents that do not fall within the traditional scope
of the privilege.
In addition, both lawyers and judges will find limited help for arguing
or deciding whether the privilege should continue to be defined by its
traditional scope or expanded to provide broader protection. While the
policy prescriptions that are offered by many commentators clearly prefer
less discovery of a lawyer’s files and more protection for documents such
as transaction work product, the reasons have not been examined in any
depth in the literature. This section will first review the discussions in the
literature and then examine the arguments the commentators present for
expanding the attorney-client privilege to protect documents that do not
reveal a client’s confidential communications.
A. How the Treatises Describe the Caselaw
The new editors of Weinstein’s Federal Evidence state in a heading
that the “Privilege Protects Both Communications From Client to Counsel
and Communications From Counsel to Client.”138 That description of the
law will appear supportive to a reader trying to withhold a document such
as a letter from counsel to the client, especially if the reader gives less
attention to the end of the first sentence of the text which declares that this
is true if the requirements of the privilege are met.139 That misreading is all
too likely because there is no immediate reminder that those requirements
exclude from the privilege “information obtained by the attorney from third
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parties . . . or from public documents or other public sources,” an
explanation that comes three pages later.140 Instead, the footnote to the
main statement summarizes several lower court opinions, including the
opinions in Amerada and In re LTV Securities that are so frequently cited in
support of the broader scope for the privilege.141 There is no caution that
the language quoted from Amerada may be no more than dictum, no
explanation of why the district court opinion in In re LTV Securities would
be more authoritative than the opinions of the Supreme Court, and no
mention at all of Hickman and Upjohn. While the footnote also cites and
summarizes some of the cases that applied the traditional scope of the
privilege, the reader is given no warning that the cited cases are
inconsistent and the treatise offers no explanation for resolving the
inconsistency.
Mueller and Kirkpatrick’s Federal Evidence142 discusses the topic
with similar brevity, but with more than description. These authors briefly
set out the traditional scope and the broader view, and declare the “trend of
modern authority is toward recognition of a two-way privilege covering all
confidential communications between the attorney and the client in the
course of legal representation.”143 Their declaration of a trend is not well
documented. The first court of appeals opinion they cite is from the
District of Columbia Circuit, which still applies the traditional scope of the
privilege and does not protect all communications.144 The second court of
appeals opinion they cite is actually only dictum on this issue, and a reader
consulting the opinion itself will find that the snippet quoted in the treatise
does not accurately summarize the full discussion. 145 The authors also cite,
as a comparison, a quotation from Part I of the Upjohn opinion about the
purpose of the privilege to encourage communication between attorneys
and clients.146 That is a misleading quotation in this context because
Upjohn did not hold that this purpose made all communications from
counsel privileged; Part II of Upjohn made explicit that the Court did not
accept what these commentators describe as the trend. 147 They also declare
that the proposed Federal Rules adopted the broader view148 but cite no
140
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authority for that statement and do not discuss the cases that have
questioned that position. Finally, they list two policy arguments: A
broader rule will be more efficient because there will not be factual
disputes, and it will allow attorneys to “speak more freely with their clients
without concern” of compelled disclosure.149 They present no further
support for these policy arguments.
The commentary in Wright and Graham’s volume on the Federal
Rules of Evidence150 is quite critical of the other treatises. It describes
Weinstein’s Federal Evidence as “non-committal” with footnotes that “give
a quite distorted view of the federal caselaw”151 and describes the first
edition of Mueller and Kirkpatrick’s Federal Evidence as “an equally
skewed presentation of the precedents.”152 A similar criticism might be
directed to this treatise as well, since it cites no authority in asserting that
the “[r]ejected Rules [made] all attorney communications privileged.”153
and does not document its conclusion that the Advisory Committee
proposal was “rejecting narrower formulations of the privilege.”154 The
treatise does arrange the various versions of the scope of the privilege for
an attorney’s communications to the client in order: Those that reveal the
client’s confidences, those just based on the client’s confidences, any that
contain a lawyer’s advice, and finally, any legal communication from a
lawyer.155 While many of the usual courts of appeal cases are cited, the
issue is not examined, there is no attempt to reconcile the different cases,
and the Supreme Court goes unmentioned. Instead, the reader is told that
California follows the broader view. There is a brief mention of policy
arguments suggesting that the traditional scope may require nice
distinctions and factual inquiries, while the broad rule may not be
necessary to an effective privilege, but there is no effort to defend either.
The lawyer seeking guidance on the federal law is left with little more than
commiseration and good wishes:
The choice is by no means clear cut and decisions may turn on the
degree to which a particular court views the privilege as a benefit or a
156
burden to the legal system.

Wright and Graham’s discussion points out how the commentary in
McCormick on Evidence has changed over the years. The original 1954
149
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edition endorsed the traditional scope of the privilege, with no more than a
grudging concession that a communication from counsel might also be
protected if it would reveal the client’s own communication or be an
implied communication of the client, and expressed hostility to extending
the privilege to other communic ations.157 In 1972 the revisers of
McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence softened that position with
a caution that “the matter is not free from difficulty,” 158 and in the later
editions there was further change. McCormick on Evidence now declares
that the “simpler and preferable rule, adopted by . . . the better reasoned
cases, extends the protection of the privilege also to communications by the
lawyer to the client.”159 The text neither expressly includes nor excludes
the federal law of the privilege within this conclusion, but the footnote
presents the federal cases of Amerada and In re LTV Securities as the
primary authority. 160
The full meaning of the advice in the 1999 version of McCormick on
Evidence is unclear, because the following paragraph decla res that the
privilege should not include “information obtained from sources other than
the client,” 161 but neither that paragraph nor the preceding one discusses
which rule should be paramount if both situations exist. Transaction work
product often involves a confidential document in which the attorney told
the client what counsel learned from a third party or gave advice to the
client based on information counsel learned from a third party on a specific
issue. The reader may well interpret the discussion as meaning that if both
situations exist, the transaction work product should be covered by the
privilege, because that is how the text summarizes what it labels the “better
reasoned” cases. The only federal cases cited are Amerada and In re LTV
Securities, but the discussion provides no explanation of why these two
cases should be considered better reasoned than all the cases that support
the traditional scope originally endorsed by Dean McCormick, nor any
mention of the cases that do support his original position. The only other
reason for changing Dean McCormick’s endorsement of the traditional
scope is that the broader rule is “simpler.”162 Whether it is simpler is not
examined in the current edition, but it will be considered here shortly.
The lawyer or judge who looks beyond these treatises will find
authors who provide other surveys, both longer and shorter, of the caselaw
157
158
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from the lower federal courts163 or practicing lawyers who present
arguments for protecting their files from discovery. 164
While this
commentary provides more material to read, it may still be more
misleading than helpful. Creating the impression that there are equally
authoritative cases supporting either the traditional scope or a broader
scope does not help a la wyer identify the correct rule. Listing various cases
without trying to reconcile and explain them will leave lawyers wondering
how to support the privilege if they do invoke it to protect transaction
documents. Similarly, noting an array of decisions is not enough to prepare
a judge to interpret the precedent correctly. By ignoring the Supreme
Court’s decisions and generally declining to examine the debate over the
scope of the privilege, these authors suggest that this is a topic the Supreme
Court has left to the lower courts without guidance. The issue that is left
virtually unexplored is whether there is any authority or any compelling
reasons for the lower federal courts to abandon the traditional scope of the
privilege that was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Hickman and Upjohn.
The lawyer or judge who takes Wright and Graham’s endorsement of
the California position165 as a suggestion to seek more guidance from state
law will be unlikely to find much help in evaluating the policy arguments.
The state law that applies the broader scope of the privilege is likely to
depend on specific statutory language. For example, in California a
confidential communication is defined as including “a legal opinion formed
and the advice given by the lawyer.”166 That language was proposed by the
California Law Revision Commission three decades ago with this
comment:
The
lawyer-client, physician-patient, and psychotherapist-patient
privileges all protect “information transmitted” between the parties . . . .
In addition, the physician-patient and psycho-therapist-patient
privileges protect “information obtained by an examination of the
patient.” . . . . It has been suggested that the quoted language [of the
present statutes] may not protect a professional opinion or diagnosis
that has been formed on the basis of the protected communications. If
these sections were construed to leave such opinions and diagnoses
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unprotected, the privileges would be virtually destroyed. Therefore,
[the three statutes] should be amended to make it clear that such
167
opinions and diagnoses are protected by these privileges.

Because the comment lumps all three privileges together for a
common solution of the potential problem it describes, it is hard to view the
California position on this issue as being based on any unique feature of the
relationship between lawyer and client. It also creates a remedy that
exceeds the stated rationale by protecting all opinions of the three kinds of
professionals, because some of those opinions might not be based on a
protected communication. In a similar fashion, the statute in Washington
includes the “advice given” by an attorney as within the privilege,168 but
there is little supporting analysis of any policy in the caselaw. A Tenth
Circuit opinion recognized that Kansas law provides that a privileged
communication includes “advice given by the lawyer” and quickly asserted
that the circuit followed the same rule without attempting to fully account
for all federal caselaw.169 Even if the opinion was correct about Kansas
law, it did not present any arguments that lawyers could use to convince
other federal judges about the proper scope of the privilege under federal
law.
B. Assessing the Arguments for the Broader Scope
The arguments for applying the broader scope of the privilege have
been sketched so briefly in the literature that they provide little except
assertions. Because the caselaw offers even less analysis, these arguments
should be canvassed to see how much support they might provide. The
first is a policy argument: That a broader scope furthers the objective of the
privilege by encouraging the client to seek advice from counsel and to
inform counsel of all relevant information. 170 This argument suggests that
counsel should be able to assure the client that all disclosures are privileged
and that they will be protected from being revealed even indirectly. The
second is an efficiency argument: That a broader scope will reduce the
number or complexity of discovery disputes over the issue.171 The third is
an argument about effect: That a broader scope will make so little
difference in what is discoverable that there is no reason to jeopardize
167
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client confidence in the protection afforded by the privilege and no reason
to waste judicial resources on parsing the distinction between the client’s
disclosures and the attorney’s advice.172 While each argument might
support limits on routine discovery of some documents on specific facts,
the primary and more difficult question is whether they support the
proposition that the scope of the privilege should include all
communications from a lawyer to a client.
The first argument starts with the propositions that a lawyer should be
able to assure the client that the client’s disclosures are protected and that
the lack of assurances will affect a lawyer’s ability to provide legal
services. The propositions, however, seem to be employed for a broader
conclusion. Even under the traditional scope of the privilege, the lawyer
can assure the client that most of their exchanges will be protected, because
the privilege clearly protects both the client’s confidential disclosures and
any advice or response by the lawyer if it directly or indirectly reveals the
client’s disclosures.
If the lawyer does not perform any factual
investigation of outside sources, then any advice or response based on the
client’s description of the facts will be privileged, because it would reveal
directly or indirectly what the client disclosed to the lawyer. A lawyer may
have to invest extra time and care to separate advice based only on the
client’s disclosures and reports of counsel’s factual investigations, but a
lawyer who assures the client that this will be done can likewise guarantee
confidentiality for the client’s factual disclosures under the traditional
scope of the privilege.
The first argument also depends on an implicit assumption that this
issue about the scope of the privilege is the only exception that would
prevent a lawyer from providing solid assurance about the scope of the
privilege. If the lawyer will become actively involved in setting up the
transaction with the client, the issue of whether the lawyer’s legal advice is
protected by the privilege is not always going to be the only question, or
even the most important question, about the scope of the privilege. Under
federal law the privilege at most protects legal advice and does not protect
business advice or nonlegal services that are wholly separable from the
legal advice.173 As a result, there is also a risk that a document in the
transaction file will be considered business advice and not protected by the
attorney-client privilege, or that an inquiry from the client will be found to
be a request for business services and not a privileged communication
seeking legal advice. Even if assurances to the client about the privilege
are important, broadening the scope of the privilege to include the lawyer’s
172
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non-litigation work product does not mean that the lawyer will be able to
assure the client of complete confidentiality under the privilege.
The second argument also depends on an implicit assumption, in this
case that there is a version of the privilege that will require significantly
less judicial fact-finding. Although it will often seem that a different rule
could be more easily applied in the case in which the dispute has arisen,
changing the rule will still require judicial fact-finding in cases affected by
the new rule. A rule that avoids the need for any fact-finding might seem
reasonably fair if it could be applied to facts that cannot easily be altered by
the parties, but that is not the setting in which this privilege rule is applied.
Attorneys will know the parameters of the rule and will have strong
incentives to create facts that maximize the protection provided by the
privilege.174 A rule that protected every document in a lawyer’s file could
be easily applied, but it would make the lawyer’s file a sanctuary for third
party documents and non-legal business advice. A rule that protected every
document that included any legal advice could also be easily applied, but it
would also protect summaries of third party information. Unless counsel’s
own conduct or assertions are going to be considered sufficient to establish
the scope of the privilege, there will always be factual disputes at the
margin of any rule.
The third argument, that the broader scope of the privilege will not
have much effect, is most powerful under an assumption that lawyers are
not very involved in factual investigations of transactions for their clients.
It loses its power if the privilege issue concerns documents in which a
lawyer did report on factual investigations. The lawyer’s report to the
client about public information or third person statements may be very
significant, even if it does not indirectly reveal anything about the client’s
own disclosures to counsel. Although in many cases the information in the
lawyer’s report may also be obtainable directly from the client by
deposition or document discovery, that may not be as powerful or accurate.
For example, the disputed issues might be when a party learned about a
certain fact and whether the party should have realized the importance of
that fact. If the party learned that fact when their counsel reported on the
results of an investigation into public information or third party interviews,
that report will be very relevant even though it does not reveal what the
client told counsel. Similarly, if the party learned that fact when their own
counsel reported on facts they had been told by the other party to the
transaction, that report will be relevant even though it does not disclose
what the client told counsel.
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These arguments, sketched in the literature without any supporting
empirical data, add little support to the case for the broader scope of the
privilege. As for any issue for which there is little hard data, who wins this
argument may depend on who has the burden of persuasion. These
arguments might serve as a starting point if the issue was unsettled with
conflicting lines of precedent of equal authority, but they are not sufficient
to negate the long history behind the traditional scope of the privilege or
the precedential value of the Supreme Court opinions.
Perhaps the arguments set out in the literature should be viewed from
a somewhat different perspective, as assertions that such products of the
lawyer’s work should not be routinely discoverable. Excluding transaction
work product from routine discovery would not provide the absolute
protection of a privilege, but it would still respond to the main thrust of
each argument. Clients could be given assurances about the privilege,
because any complete assurance always would have to acknowledge the
various limits and exceptions of privilege doctrine. There would be good
reason to expect that discovery demands would not often create disputes for
the court to resolve if the rule started with the proposition that such
material is not routinely discoverable. The concern about the balance
between the need for discovery and the long term effect on the role of
lawyers would not be ignored, because it would be a factor in defining the
situations where nonroutine discovery would be permitted.
The structure of the attorney-client privilege under federal law does
not provide any readily available body of rules for doing the kind of
balancing that would exclude routine discovery of the lawyer’s work and
advice found in the transaction file, but permit discovery where it was
needed and appropriate. Such rules could be developed, but they may not
be necessary if another body of doctrine could be developed from the
dormant principles that the Supreme Court has already established for nonlitigation work product.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF WORK P RODUCT DOCTRINE
There are two related reasons to ask whether confidential documents a
lawyer generates while representing a client in a transaction could be
protected from discovery by an uncodified branch of work product doctrine
instead of by the attorney-client privilege. If these documents have at least
work product protection, then they would not be routinely discoverable and
there would be less reason to protect them by expanding the scope of the
attorney-client privilege. If these documents do not get even this limited
protection, then the reasons for that conclusion might also be relevant to
defining the scope of the attorney-client privilege. This question has not
been asked often, so there is not an extensive body of caselaw that might
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provide a direct answer. Instead, it is valuable to examine how the law
might evolve from the foundation already set in place.
A. A Second Look at Supreme Court Precedent
At its origin in Hickman the work product doctrine was described in
terms that can be read in more than one way. From one perspective it
might appear that the Court was invoking an implicit limitation on what
could be demanded under the discovery rules it had recently adopted, while
from another perspective it might appear that the Court was adopting a rule
to protect the litigation process. Perhaps the Court was doing both and
even more. If the doctrine is a limitation on the reach of the discovery
rules, then litigation may be a necessary condition to create the duty to
comply with a discovery demand but not a necessary element of what is
protected. If the doctrine protects only the litigation process, then litigation
will be both a necessary condition for that duty and a necessary element of
what is protected.
Considering the possibility of protecting non-litigation work product
five decades after Hickman and three decades after the adoption of Rule
26(b)(3) is difficult, because both the case and the rule focus attention on
the work product doctrine as a discovery rule that is applied in a litigation
setting. As a result, there is a tendency to think of work product as a
doctrine invoked by litigators during litigation to protect only their work as
litigators and not to protect legal work performed during the underlying
transaction. There is typically little occasion to think about the doctrine
outside the setting of litigation, because without litigation there is usually
no compulsion to disclose confidential material. That still leaves open the
possibility that the work product doctrine could be invoked in litigation to
protect the work of lawyers who worked on the transaction before there
was any expectation of litigation. A survey of the language of Hickman
will help illustrate what is at least a possible alternative reading of this
precedent.
Some language in Hickman describes a general limit on the discovery
rules, and does so in a way that could apply to any kind of material. For
instance, the Court states that “discovery, like all matters of procedure, has
ultimate and necessary boundaries . . . .”175 The Court continues: “In our
opinion, neither Rule 26 nor any other rule dealing with discovery
contemplates production under such circumstances . . . . [The material]
falls outside the arena of discovery . . . .”176
Other language in the opinion describes a limit on discovery of the
175
176
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work of lawyers with language that could equally apply to the files of
litigators in particular or of all attorneys in general:
Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted
inquiries into the files and mental impressions of an attorney.
....
. . . When Rule 26 and other discovery rules were adopted, this Court
and the members of the bar in general certainly did not believe or
contemplate that all the files and mental processes of lawyers were
thereby opened to the free scrutiny of their adversaries. And we refuse
to interpret the rules at this time so as to reach so harsh and
177
unwarranted a result.

A third selection of quotations from the opinion can be presented to
show the Court’s focus on the work of litigators and protecting the
litigation process:
[The demand] contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly
prosecution and defense of legal claims.
....
. . . [T]he general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney’s
course of preparation is so well recognized and so essential to an
orderly working of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests on
the one who would invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons to
178
justify production . . . .

The opinion began by defining the problem as discovery of material
prepared “in the course of preparation for possible litigation” 179 and clearly
remained focused on “written materials obtained or prepared by an
adversary’s counsel with an eye toward litigation . . . .”180 The policy
arguments sketched in the opinion, however, could apply equally to
litigators or all lawyers:
Examination into a person’s files and records, including those resulting
from the professional activities of an attorney, must be judged with
care.
It is not without reason that various safeguards have been
established to preclude unwarranted excursions into the privacy of a
man’s work.
....
Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted
inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney.
....
177
178
179
180

Id. at 510-14.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947).
Id. at 497.
Id. at 511.
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In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer
work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion
by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client’s
case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to
the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan
his strategy without undue and needless interference.
...
This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements,
memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal
beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways—aptly though
roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case. . . as the
“work product of the lawyer.” Were such materials open to opposing
counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing
would remain unwritten. An attorney’s thoughts, heretofore inviolate,
would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices
would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would
be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of
181
justice would be poorly served.

When the Hickman opinion discussed whether the defendants could
be required to produce counsel’s memoranda that recorded the oral
statements of witnesses or whether the defendants could be required to
repeat what counsel learned in oral interviews and did not write down, the
language described a policy argument that could apply broadly to the work
of all lawyers:
Under ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or write out all
that witnesses have told him and to deliver the account to his adversary
gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness . . . .
The standards of the profession would thereby suffer.
....
. . . [Petitioner’s reason] is insufficient under the circumstances to
permit him an exception to the policy underlying the privacy of
182
Fortenbaugh’s professional activities.

There may not be a single interpretation that can be cla imed to capture
the only true meaning of Hickman, because there is support in its language
for more than one conclusion about the extent of work product protection.
It is also important to recognize that this opinion did not bind the work
product doctrine to any fixed standard or any single policy argument. The
Court was not interpreting a statute nor eliciting an interpretation of a welldeveloped body of caselaw. Instead, the opinion was imposing a limiting
181
182

Id. at 497-511.
Id. at 512-13.
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interpretation on the discovery rules the Court itself had recently adopted.
When the Court applied Hickman in Upjohn,183 the litigation setting
was substantially different. Upjohn involved an attempt by the IRS to
enforce a summons to obtain certain records from the company and certain
information from its counsel, but neither the records nor the information
were the product of any litigation at the time they were created. 184 Instead,
the materials were created before there was any litigation but after Upjohn
had learned about “questionable payments” during an audit of a foreign
subsidiary. 185 In response, Upjohn’s chairman of the board had directed
Upjohn’s general counsel to conduct an investigation and had ordered its
employees to cooperate.186 There was no litigation at the time, and no
litigation until after Upjohn submitted a report about the payments to the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service.187
Even then, there was no litigation about Upjohn’s taxes or securities
filings.188 The only litigation was the suit by the IRS to enforce the
summons.189 Upjohn appealed from the district court’s order to produce
the material and asserted that the materials were both privileged and work
product.190 In its opinion on appeal, the court of appeals considered the
work product argument only in a concluding footnote that stated that the
work product doctrine did not apply to an IRS administrative summons.191
What the Supreme Court did in Upjohn had the effect of applying the
work product doctrine to protect material that had been created before there
was any litigation. Perhaps the company should have anticipated that the
corporate conduct they asked counsel to investigate would inevitably lead
to some kind of litigation, but the Court’s opinion did not even discuss
whether the materials were prepared in anticipation of litigation. That
result is clear on the facts of the case, but it is also a result that has been
almost ignored in the evolution of work product doctrine. The important
question is why.
The Upjohn opinion did not have to extensively discuss whether the
work product doctrine could protect confidential material created by
counsel outside of litigation, because the government conceded that the
doctrine did apply and chose to argue that it had made a sufficient showing

183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1981).
See id. at 386-88.
See id. at 386.
See id. at 387.
See id. at 387-88.
See id.
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 388 (1981).
See id.
United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1228 n. 13 (6th Cir. 1979).
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to support the discovery ordered by the lower courts.192 The government’s
concession may have been the wisest tactic, because the statement by the
court of appeals that work product was not applicable at all was supported
only by a string citation to six cases. Of these six cases, five were opinions
that did not directly discuss work product,193 and one was an opinion that
assumed work product might be applicable but which found the particular
document in that case was not work product.194 The Supreme Court’s
discussion, however, appears to accept the government’s concession as
covering not only the question of whether the work product doctrine
generally applied to IRS summonses, but also to the further question of
whether it applied to the specific facts of Upjohn.
The Upjohn opinion did not examine whether the material was work
product under any specific language of Rule 26(b)(3); it also did not
articulate a test or explain why the actual material could be described as
having been created in anticipation of litigation. In addition, the Court did
not find it necessary to specify whether it was invoking the work product
rule of Rule 26(b)(3), the doctrine of Hickman, or both. Rather, the Upjohn
Court declared broadly that the tax summons was “subject to the traditional
privileges and limitations”195 including the work product doctrine, which it
noted was both “substantially incorporated” 196 and “codifie[d]”197 in Rule
26(b)(3).
The Court’s discussion of the work product issue focused on the
government’s argument that it had made a sufficient showing to obtain
work product and that the magistrate had properly ordered production of
the memoranda and notes created by Upjohn’s general counsel. 198 The
Court specifically held that the Magistrate’s ruling was error and held that
discovery of counsel’s material should not be governed by the “substantial
need” and “without undue hardship” standards listed in the first part of
Rule 26(b)(3).199 The Supreme Court likewise made clear that it was not
going to define precisely the standard of protection for material that did not

192

See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397.
See Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1228 n.13 (citing United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 5758); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Davey, 543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973)).
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See Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1228 n.13, (citing United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174
(5th Cir. 1967)).
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Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 398.
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Id.
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Id.
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See id. at 389-95.
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See id. at 401.
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fall into that category of the rule.200 Instead, the Court remanded the case
because the court of appeals had thought there was no protection at all and
the Magistrate had given the material too little protection.201 The Court did
not base this resolution on any specific language of the Rule but, rather,
invoked both the Rule generally and the uncodified work product doctrine
based on Hickman:
The notes and memoranda sought by the Government here, however,
are work product based on oral statements . . . . To the extent they do
not reveal communications, they reveal the attorney’s mental processes
in evaluating the communications. As Rule 26 and Hickman make
clear, such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of
substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue
202
hardship.

The Court’s reasoning for providing a higher level of protection to the
specific work product in Upjohn did not focus on the litigation process
alone:
Forcing an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda of witnesses’ oral
statements is particularly disfavored because it tends to reveal the
attorney’s mental processes . . . .
....
. . . [T]he Hickman court stressed the danger that compelled disclosure
of such memoranda [based on oral statements of witnesses] would
203
reveal the attorney’s mental processes.

Equally important as what the Court did in Upjohn may be what it did
not do, particularly the omission of certain language of the Advisory
Committee’s Note from the 1970 amendments. At that time the committee
included this sentence about the extent of Rule 26(b)(3):
Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to
public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation
purposes are not under the qualified immunity provided by this
204
subdivision.

Although a quick reading of this sentence may suggest that it negates
any limitation on discovery of material that is unrelated to litigation, that
interpretation is contrary to what the Court held in Upjohn. Part III of the
Upjohn opinion is an important reminder that it is equally plausible to read
the Advisory Committee’s Note describing Rule 26(b)(3) as no more than a
partial codification of work product doctrine, with language that governs
200
201
202
203
204

See id. at 401.
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 402 (1981).
Id. at 401.
Id. at 399-400.
1970 Advisory Committee’s Note, supra note 17.
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only material related to litigation. That would mean the federal courts
should look beyond the language of the rule if the issue is whether there is
any protection for material unrelated to litigation. That would be consistent
with the structure of the Upjohn result, where the Court invoked the
language of the rule to describe the trial judge’s duty to limit discovery of
“the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an
attorney” 205 but left the extent of the protection to further evolution by
caselaw.
The result in Upjohn can also be read as evidence that litigation is no
more than a necessary condition to the applicability of work product
doctrine, because the client did not need a ground to resist the IRS demand
for its counsel’s confidential documents until the Government filed the
action to enforce the administrative summons. Certainly the Court did not
make any effort to define litigation as a necessary element of what is
protected. While litigation may always be in prospect any time a taxpayer
does anything affecting tax liability, the Court did not mention whether
that, or similar facts, would be enough to find that the documents were
assembled by counsel in anticipation of litigation. This silence is tacit
confirmation that an uncodified work product doctrine that protected
transaction documents would not be inconsistent with the framework
established by Hickman and Upjohn.
There have been other Supreme Court opinions on issues related
closely enough to require a brief mention, but none of the opinions clearly
limit the doctrine to litigation work product alone. In United States v.
Nobles,206 an armed robbery case, the Court considered whether a criminal
defendant could rely on work product to defeat an order by the trial court to
provide a defense investigator’s report to the prosecutor after the
investigator testified for the defense to impeach an earlier prosecution
witness.207 After the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
that the order was barred by the Fifth Amendment, it addressed the
defendant’s alternative argument that the report was protected as work
product.208 The Court accepted the proposition that the work product
doctrine applied in criminal cases, citing Hickman as authority. 209 Not
surprisingly, since the case involved a document created for litigation, the
discussion focused on protecting work product in litigation. 210 The Court
then noted it was not necessary “to delineate the scope of the doctrine”
205
206
207
208
209
210

FED . R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
422 U.S. 225 (1975).
See id. at 227.
See id. at 230-40.
See id. at 236.
See id. at 238.
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because the defense had waived any protection. 211
While some lower courts have cited the discussion in Nobles for the
proposition that work product protects “only” material prepared in
anticipation of litigation, in each instance the citing court itself has added
the “only” to the actual language of Nobles.212 The most the Court actually
said was that the work product doctrine was “grounded in the realities of
litigation [one of which is] that attorneys often must rely on the assistance
of investigators and other agents . . . .”213 That language explained that an
investigator’s report could be protected, but even on that subject the
statement was dictum because the defense had waived any protection.
There was no need to even consider whether work product doctrine could
apply outside of litigation in a criminal case, because there is no obvious
analog to transaction work product in an armed robbery case such as
Nobles. Nobles, therefore, should not be considered dispositive of the
issue.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Grolier214 the Supreme Court
similarly discussed work product as a litigation doctrine but the facts did
not require defining its outer limits. The case involved a demand for
documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).215 The Federal
Trade Commission refused to provide the documents on the ground that
they were work product in litigation, even though the litigation was over.216
Rule 26(b)(3) applied indirectly, because the agency invoked Exemption 5
under the statute, which excludes material that would not be available “in
litigation with the agency.”217 The Supreme Court stated that Rule 26(b)(3)
did not expressly address whether work product from one case retained
work product status forever, that the Advisory Committee Notes did not
expressly mention the issue, and that a literal reading of the rule would
protect material as long as it was prepared for any litigation. 218 The Court
did not resolve which particular construction of Rule 26(b)(3) would
control in a discovery dispute. The Court did not need to do so, because
the case could be decided under FOIA policies.219 Even though the facts of
the case involved material that had been prepared for litigation, and the
211

Id. at 239.
See, e.g., In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 61 (7th Cir.
1980); Matter of Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 212-13 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings of June 16, 1981, 519 F. Supp. 791, 793 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
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opinion discussed litigation work product, the Court did not have to decide
whether litigation work product was the only material that could be
protected from discovery.
B. Non-litigation Work Product in the Federal Courts
In the years immediately after Hickman, many of the lower federal
court opinions that discussed work product did so briefly and in discussions
about materials such as accident reports or preexisting documents that were
different from the attorney’s work product in Hickman itself.220 One
opinion noted the absence of prospective litigation at the time of a
transaction as a ground for finding discovery was not limited by the work
product doctrine, but the discovery concerned only what the lawyers had
done as emissaries of the client and did not concern anything like the work
product in Hickman.221 The issue might have remained for gradual
evolution under the caselaw, but the early cases led the student authors of
the Harvard Law Review’s extensive review of discovery in its
Developments Note 222 to affirmatively endorse the requirement of
prospective litigation and to provide a policy justification that was not
directly grounded in the language of Hickman:
Since a lawyer who does not envision litigation will not anticipate
discovery requests, the fear of disclosure should not affect the way in
which the material is prepared. For example, if the owner of real
property employs an attorney to investigate the marketability of his title
preparatory to offering it for sale, it seems that the fruits of the lawyer’s
search should be fully discoverable if litigation relating to a subsequent
sale contract eventuate. In such circumstances, as in all those in which
a lawyer is asked to assist in planning future conduct, even though he
might recognize the ever present possibility of litigation, he is
prompted chiefly by his responsibility to avoid embroiling his client in
controversy . . . . Thereafter, the purchaser who declines to perform on
the ground of breach of an implied warranty of title should, it seems, be
223
granted access to the lawyer’s materials disclosing the encumbrance.

While normally a policy prescription in a student note might not
warrant attention, this Developments Note should be examined because it
was followed and cited by the lower courts224 and on some other discovery
220

See, e.g., United States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964); Park & Tilford
Distillers Corp. v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); McManus v. Harkness, 11
F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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See Rediker v. Warfield, 11 F.R.D. 125, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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Id. at 1030.
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issues by the Advisory Committee in its Note to the 1970 amendments.225
The statement in the Developments Note of the policy supporting the
doctrine is both a good illustration of the strongly held view that litigation
is an essential element of work product, and an example of how that view
leads to the conclusion that a document cannot be work product if the
author was not anticipating imminent litigation.
The logic of the
Developments Note is flawed at a fundamental level, because it depends on
combining two ideas the Supreme Court had carefully separated in
Hickman—whether the information is discoverable and whether the
information can be discovered from the lawyer’s materials. In Hickman the
Court stressed that the information was routinely discoverable as a matter
of course from the client.226 The work product doctrine of Hickman was a
limitation on routinely discovering the information from the lawyer’s
materials.227 That distinction, however, tended to get overlooked as various
cases and the leading commentators continued to assert that work product
protection was limited to material prepared for litigation and that the
purpose of the doctrine was to protect the adversary system.
Recent opinions illustrate that the requirement to show the documents
were created in anticipation of litigation is still well-entrenched in the
minds of both lawyers and judges. For example, in one of the cases in
which Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr sought to enforce a grand jury
subpoena for documents created by White House attorneys, the Eighth
Circuit held that the material was not work product.228 The Eighth Circuit
so held because the client for whom they were working, the White House,
did not anticipate litigation even though other non-clients might have
anticipated various investigations.229 The tenor of the opinion suggests that
both counsel and the court were completely focused on that issue. The
White House lawyers argued that an anticipated congressional hearing
could suffice for litigation, but the court quickly rejected that as
insufficient.230 In this case, as in courts of appeal cases that have found that
material is work product,231 the court’s analysis is always tied directly to
the rule’s requirement that litigation must have been anticipated.
If the strongly held tendency to envision work product doctrine as
protecting only the work of litigators can be suspended, it may be possible
Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431 (D. Mass. 1972).
225
See 1970 Advisory Committee Note, supra note 17, at 506.
226
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947).
227
See id. at 514.
228
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 925 (8th Cir. 1997).
229
See id. at 924.
230
See id.
231
See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 966-68 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Allen, 106
F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 1997).
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to look at an emerging body of caselaw from a different perspective. Some
recent opinions have extended the protection of Rule 26(b)(3) to material
prepared well in advance of any litigation. While some commentators have
endorsed these cases,232 others have questioned this expansion because it
seems to go beyond protecting the process of litigation. 233 There is also an
apparent awkwardness in making the results fit within the language of the
rule, because both courts and commentators appear unable to visualize a
work product doctrine not tied to the language of Rule 26(b)(3) and its
requirement that a document be prepared in anticipation of litigation. Two
recent opinions provide noteworthy examples. Even though they show no
interest in exploring the uncodified branches of work product doctrine, they
provide a factual setting for contrasting that approach with their efforts to
extend the language of the rule.
In United States v. Adlman,234 the document in dispute was a fiftyeight page detailed legal analysis that had been prepared for a corporate
attorney to evaluate the tax implications of a proposed corporate
restructuring. The study, written by a person who was both an accountant
and lawyer, considered likely IRS challenges to the reorganization and a
claim for a tax refund that would result from it.235 After the reorganization
and the request for the tax refund, the IRS began an audit, demanded the
document, and filed suit to enforce a subpoena for it.236 After one round of
appeals established that the document was not protected by the attorneyclient privilege,237 the district court then denied work product protection for
it on the ground the document was not prepared in anticipation of
litigation.238 On a second appeal a divided panel of the Second Circuit
reversed and remanded the case with instructions about the appropriate test
required by Rule 26(b)(3). The majority concluded that the trial judge
might have applied a narrow test that would protect only documents
prepared “primarily” to aid in litigation. The majority recognized that this
test had support in federal caselaw, but found it too limited. 239 The
majority held that a document could be protected even if the party had a
business purpose for the document, if the document analyzed the likely
outcome of litigation and it was not prepared in the ordinary course of
232
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United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998).
235
See id.
236
See id. at 1195-96.
237
United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1497 (2d Cir. 1995).
238
United States v. Adlman, No. M-18-304 (WK), 1996 WL 84502, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 27, 1996).
239
See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198.
233

276

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:229

business.240 The majority directed the trial judge to use a test endorsed by
the Wright and Miller Federal Practice treatise that protects a document
created “because of” the prospect of litigation. 241 The dissenting judge
argued that this test would expand work product protection to documents
prepared for reviewing a planned transaction. 242
The potential application of the test prescribed in Adlman can be
illustrated by the contrast between an example in the opinion and the actual
facts of the case. The example described a publisher who was considering
publication of a book for which a competitor asserted exclusive rights; it
also assumed the competitor was threatening suit, so the publisher obtained
legal advice about the likely outcome of the suit.243 The majority
concluded that the document containing the lawyer’s advice should be
protected as work product, a result that would not occur if litigation had to
be the principal purpose for the document. The opinion, therefore, held
that it was only necessary to find that it was prepared “because of”
litigation.244 There was no similar threat of litigation on the facts of
Adlman, only the reality that tax liability can be disputed and that disputes
can lead to litigation. The litigation more likely in prospect when the
document was prepared may have been a dispute over disclosure of the
document itself, but it would be circular to use the prospect of that
litigation to invoke Rule 26(b)(3). Instead, the litigation the court must
have had in mind was the litigation between the IRS and the taxpayer over
the amount of taxes owed, litigation that had not begun and might never
begin.
The uncertain prospect for any litigation at the time the document was
created in Adlman is similar to the facts of Upjohn.245 In both cases there
were possible tax consequences of significant impact, and thus each
taxpayer could credibly assert they were concerned about at least an IRS
response and even a dispute. In both cases actual litigation was not present,
but the possibility of litigation is often considered by counsel when doing
factual research, drafting documents, or advising a client about a
transaction. Accepting such a distant or indirect prospect of litigation as
sufficient does provide an immediate formula for expanding the reach of
Rule 26(b)(3), but it does so by placing some strain on the language of the
rule.

240
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A second recent opinion extending work product protection is In re
Sealed Case.246 The issue was whether a federal grand jury could enforce a
subpoena issued to a lawyer for the Republican National Committee who
had worked on a 1994 transaction that was later attacked as a possible
campaign funding violation. 247 The transaction was one subject of a
complaint that was filed with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in
1995; the subpoena came two years after that.248 The court said the record
did not tell what happened to the complaint, and the court did not explain
whether the FEC complaint was related to the later subpoena.249 The
district court applied the “in anticipation of litigation” rule and found that
the documents prepared before a complaint was filed with the FEC were
not protected. 250 The circuit court held that this timeline was too limited.251
Instead, it concluded that the work product protection included documents
prepared for a matter the client feared could lead to litigation. 252 The court
suggested such a broad rule was necessary to avoid undermining lawyer
effectiveness at the particularly critical stage when the client needs advice
about how to proceed lawfully or needs legal advice assessing the potential
risks of litigation from undertaking a particular step. 253
The circuit court extracted various elements that had to be established
to show that a document was prepared “because of the prospect of
litigation,” concluding that the lawyer had to have “a subjective belief that
litigation was a real possibility” and that the “belief must have been
objectively reasonable.”254 The Court then described the choices as
requiring either the existence of a specific claim or a broader test that
considered all the relevant circumstances. The court rejected the narrower
interpretation and held that the document could be work product if it was
created when counsel “rendered legal advice in order to protect the client
from future litigation about a particular transaction,” 255 even if there was no
specific claim at that time. The court expressed some concern that the
record evidence could have been stronger on the lawyer’s subjective belief
that there would be litigation, but found it sufficient.256 The Court also
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found that the belief the transaction might lead to litigation was objectively
reasonable.257
By repeating that the work product doctrine would not include
documents counsel prepared “in the ordinary course of business or for other
non-litigation purposes,” the court set a limit that would exclude some
transaction documents from its broadened standard for determining what
might be in anticipation of litigation.258 Perhaps it is notable that at this
point in the opinion the court was not surveying policy arguments in
protecting the specific documents, as it had earlier, but was simply
recounting earlier precedent from the circuit.259 On this issue, the opinion
fits well with many others that are cited by commentators to support broad
application of work product protection for documents prepared “because
of” litigation even though they limit the protection by tying the analysis to
the language of Rule 26(b)(3).260 Like other opinions, it does not appear to
have produced any examination of whether its policy could be better
applied by abandoning the language of the rule as the sole authority for the
work product doctrine.
C. Beyond the Coverage of Rule 26(b)(3)
The extensive Advisory Committee’s Note that explained Rule
26(b)(3) when it was adopted in 1970 is another relevant source that
addresses whether the rule might provide the only possible protection for
all work product.261 The Advisory Committee’s Note primarily focused on
trial preparation material. It described how discovery of documents had
been limited by both the requirement to show good cause under Rule 34
and the separate work product doctrine of Hickman.262 It concluded that
relevance had become the usual standard for good cause, and that the
“overwhelming proportion” of the cases that had required more than
relevance had involved trial preparation material. 263
The Advisory
Committee’s Note then explained that the good cause language in Rule 34
was being eliminated and replaced by the specific requirements of Rule
26(b)(3) for trial preparation material. 264 Other kinds of material were
covered with a general conclusion:
Apart from trial preparation, the fact that the materials sought are
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documentary does not in and of itself require a special showing beyond
relevance and absence of privilege. The protective provisions are of
course available, and if the party from whom production is sought
raises a special issue of privacy (as with respect to income tax returns
or grand jury minutes) or points to evidence primarily impeaching, or
can show serious burden or expense, the court will exercise its
265
traditional power to decide whether to issue a protective order.

The breadth of this description is not supported by any authority on
the specific issue of non-litigation work product material prepared by
counsel. The factual settings in the three cases the Advisory Committee
cited earlier for the proposition that relevance was sufficient for nonlitigation documents did not include a lawyer’s work product.266 Similarly,
when the Advisory Committee later described material “assembled in the
ordinary course of business” as not protected by the new rule, the factual
settings in the two cases that were cited did not include a lawyer’s work
product.267 The lack of caselaw in which an issue about non-litigation work
product had been raised explains both why the Note did not discuss it, and
why that silence does not compel a conclusion that either the Note or rule
negate the possibility of protection for non-litigation work product.
Some federal courts have already recognized two additions to the
work product protection of Rule 26(b)(3). The most common addition is
for counsel’s trial preparation material that has not been recorded in a
document and is just remembered by counsel. 268 Although such work
product does not fit within the Rule 26(b)(3) protection for documents and
tangible things, it does clearly fit within the protection of Hickman.269 Less
frequently, the suggestion in the Advisory Committee’s Note to use
protective orders under Rule 26(c) has also been followed in a few cases
involving work product material created by counsel for a nonparty. The
leading opinion is In re California Public Utilities Commission,270 a Ninth
Circuit decision that did not allow the Commission to assert work product
protection in a case in which it was not a party. 271 It did suggest that the
trial court could provide similar protection under Rule 26(c), on the ground
that it would be oppressive to compel discovery of material that would
265
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otherwise be characterized as work product.272 Similarly, a District Court
allowed the United States Department of Justice to regain documents that
were work product in one proceeding but had been inadvertently disclosed
to a party in a different case.273 The court found Rule 26(b)(3) did not
apply by its very terms but then found equivalent authority to protect the
material under Rule 26(c).274
The Advisory Committee also stated that material “assembled in the
ordinary course of business” is “not under” the new protection of Rule
26(b)(3),275 but it did not attempt to define that category of material in any
greater detail. The only two cases the Advisory Committee cited in support
of that statement involved accident reports by non-lawyers, not transaction
work product by counsel. 276 In addition, the descriptive phrase of “not
under” the new rule is far different from saying the material is not
protected. In other words, the issue is not resolved by either the rule or the
Advisory Committee’s Note, so Hickman and Upjohn could still provide a
foundation when the federal courts address whether and how non-litigation
work product should be protected.
V. WHAT A THIRD OPTION OFFERS A LAWYER OR JUDGE
The idea at the core of the third option is that the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine are so inherently connected that trying
to define the scope of the privilege without accounting for Hickman will
inevitably go astray. The third option is one way to describe how they are
connected. Doing no more than recognizing that discovery of transaction
work product could be limited under the uncodified policy of Hickman
would have an effect on both privilege law and discovery law, but in
different ways. For the attorney-client privilege it is not necessary that the
third option be fully defined and it is not essential to know its exact limits,
because even the possibility of this alternative and the reasons it does or
does not protect transaction documents will provide a different perspective
about the proper scope of the privilege. The third option also provides a
useful measure when sorting documents as privileged or not privileged,
both for an attorney deciding whether to assert the privilege and for a judge
deciding whether to sustain the assertion of the privilege. For discovery
law, the effect will not be as immediate because it will be no more than a
rough sketch of a possible development until lawyers actually assert the
272
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third option as the ground for withholding documents from discovery.
Only then will judges have to decide how much of the uncodified policy of
Hickman remains viable and define the limits of the uncodified policy.
The third option will not matter for many items in an attorney’s
transaction file. The attorney-client privilege is still sufficient to protect
the documents in the transaction file that are factual disclosures by the
client to counsel. That would include letters from the client to counsel that
set out the client’s understanding of the facts involved in the transaction or
the client’s objectives in the transaction, as well as copies of letters from
counsel to the client that repeat the client’s earlier disclosures. The
privilege is also sufficient to protect documents in the transaction file that
indirectly reveal the client’s factual disclosures, so counsel will still need to
imagine all the various ways in which material might be used and then
assert the privilege to protect documents where there is a reasonable
explanation of how it might indirectly reveal what the client said.
In every instance in which the privilege is the ground for refusing to
disclose a document the explanation needs to be listed in the privilege log
in sufficient detail to demonstrate to the judge that the document is
privileged, and counsel needs to be ready to articulate a sufficient ground in
support of the privilege.277 Although it is essential that the lawyer was
providing legal advice, not business advice, if the privilege is to apply, it
will not be sufficient to describe the document as providing legal advice or
communicating with the client, because that description does not tie the
content of the document to the client’s disclosures to counsel. At times the
document itself may provide clear evidence that it contains information
from the client, but a regular flow of federal court opinions makes clear
that the better course is to explain what makes the document privileged. 278
Where the document is a composite, such as occurs when counsel annotates
or edits a proposed contract document, the assertion of the privilege
requires an explanation of the source of what the lawyer wrote.279
Both counsel asserting the attorney-client privilege and a judge ruling
on that privilege ought to keep the categories of litigation work product and
transaction work product in mind, because both provide a touchstone for
277
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determining when a document is not privileged. As a rough measure, work
product includes the documents, written by counsel in the course of
providing legal advice, which do not contain the client’s confidential
disclosures. This measure does not have to be an exact discriminator and is
not the sole standard. The privilege may not apply because the document
involves business advice, because it was not confidential, or because
counsel was simply sent an extra copy of a business document.280
Nevertheless, it can provide a useful guide for sorting transaction
documents. A document that would be instantly recognized as work
product, and nothing but work product, if it had been created in anticipation
of litigation, should be regarded as unlikely to be privileged just because it
was created earlier in time.
Even when material looks like it is work product and appears to have
been created by counsel well in advance of the current litigation, there are
other tactical factors for a lawyer to consider before trying to protect a
document under the third option. In those circuits that have extended the
work product protection of Rule 26(b)(3) well back in time by recognizing
even the possibility of litigation as sufficient to find the document was
created in anticipation of litigation,281 counsel may prefer to assert just the
rule and the circuit caselaw to protect such work product. In those circuits,
the district judges or magistrate judges may likewise find sufficient
authority to sustain the objection to discovery with the issues framed by the
circuit caselaw.
The initial impetus to consider the value of the third option may come
from a lawyer or a judge—perhaps from a lawyer trying to protect
transaction work product that does not fit even the extended interpretations
of Rule 26(b)(3), from a lawyer in a circuit with a narrow reading of the
rule, or from a court that recognizes the need to reevaluate the limited
choices currently available. There will still be more work to be done,
because the third option provides only an alternative starting point and not
a complete set of answers. One core idea of Hickman was that a lawyer
providing relevant information and a candid assessment about a legal issue
to a client should not be worried that the result of putting that advice in
writing would be discovery of the document in any litigation. 282 That was
not a sufficient reason to include all work product within the privilege, but
it was sufficient to exclude it from routine discovery. This worry about the
same potential exposure for transaction work product might likewise affect
how lawyers provide information to a client during the research and
negotiation of the transaction. Although both client and counsel might
280
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hope that the transaction will become a success and that there will be no
litigation, realistic counsel would realize that any transaction can lead to
litigation.
Recognizing that the transaction work product doctrine might protect
the documents counsel wrote to inform the client about facts revealed by
the other party, facts learned from third parties, or counsel’s drafting
advice, would reduce the routine intrusion into counsel’s transaction file
but not exclude all possibility of discovery. Rule 26(b)(3) now requires
certain procedural steps derived from the requirements of Hickman; the
same steps could be applied by analogy to transaction work product
protection. Instead of the all-or-nothing result that follows from the court’s
ruling when privilege is the basis for the objection to discovery, a ruling
that documents are transaction work product would only exclude them
from routine discovery. As Hickman suggested, an opposing party might
be able to get the same information directly from the client using other
discovery tools;283 if so, the facts would not be hidden in the transaction file
alone. Even if the opposing party could not get the same information
directly, it might not be sufficiently relevant to justify invading the privacy
of either the attorney’s work or the attorney’s relationship with the client.
On this issue the analogous application of the existing rule would put a
burden on the party demanding discovery to show relevance and inability
to obtain the information elsewhere.
A recent decision by the Second Circuit illustrates both when the
federal courts will limit discovery of non-litigation work product and why
the evolution of the uncodified doctrine in these cases can be easily
overlooked. 284 The facts of In re Grand Jury Proceedings involved a 1998
meeting of representatives of a company with officials of the Federal
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) to discuss whether the
company was facilitating illegal firearms transactions.285 There was no
pending litigation at the time, and the company claimed it was assured its
limited role meant it did not need to be concerned about legal liability. 286
At the time the company’s counsel created some non-privileged documents
and had an assistant take notes at the ATF meeting. 287 A year later the
company’s counsel testified before a grand jury about the ATF meeting but
withheld the notes as work product. The government moved for production
of the notes and asked the court to bar the company from asserting work
product protection for all documents concerning the subject the grand jury
283
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was investigating. 288 The district court held that the work product
protection had been waived, found that the government had shown
sufficient need for the notes, and ordered them produced. 289 The Second
Circuit reversed for reconsideration of the waiver issue.290
Although the Second Circuit left the issue of whether any item was
work product for the trial court on remand,291 it did outline some
“Governing Principles” as a foundation for the remand on the waiver
issue.292 Although the grand jury was investigating a criminal offense, the
court did not distinguish the rule in criminal cases from the rule that would
apply if the material had been demanded in civil discovery; it noted that the
Supreme Court had “applied” 293 the work product doctrine of Hickman v.
Taylor in a criminal case in United States v. Nobles.294 The court also
noted the different standards for fact and opinion work-product under Rule
26(b)(3) but did not apply that Rule and did not describe the material as
prepared in anticipation of litigation. The relevant part of the opinion
quoted the policy arguments of Hickman as applicable to a demand for
disclosure of non-litigation material,295 clearly suggesting that the policy
should apply to the documents in dispute. While this means the facts of the
case show a situation in which a federal court did not permit routine
discovery of non-litigation work product, the opinion does not advertise the
result in that way. In that regard this opinion is similar to Upjohn,296 where
the facts must also be read carefully to recognize the implications of the
Supreme Court’s holding.
As lawyers assert the third option, the extent of protection for
transaction work product can evolve in response to the facts of various
cases. It may not take the twenty-three years between Hickman and Rule
26(b)(3), but eventually there would be enough caselaw and commentary to
suggest whether Rule 26(b)(3) needs to be expanded to cover other kinds of
work product and whether material such as transaction work product
should receive the same or different protection than litigation work product.
Among the questions the courts still need to explore is the question whether
the transaction work product category should include only the work of
lawyers instead of the broad description of all who can create litigation
work product under Rule 26(b)(3). Until those details emerge, the third
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option at least can provide an alternative to a litigant who believes that a
lawyer’s non-privileged transaction work product should not be routinely
discoverable, an alternative to judges who conclude there should be some
protection from routine discovery but are unwilling to overextend the
language of Rule 26(b)(3), and a more coherent alternative that does not
distort the traditional scope of the attorney-client privilege.

